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SUMMARY
The success of unmanned aerial vehicles in recent military actions guarantees that
their role in future operations will continue to expand. This expansion will routinely place
unmanned vehicles in high threat environments and in close proximity to humans. Op-
eration in both regimes requires an improvement in the current state of unmanned aerial
vehicle reliability and fault-tolerance. The Office of the Secretary of Defense acknowledges
this shortcoming in the UAV Roadmap 2005-2030 by stating that, “Improving UA [un-
manned aircraft] reliability is the single most immediate and long-reaching need to ensure
their success” [2].
Research has presented several approaches to achieve varying degrees of fault-tolerance
in unmanned aircraft. Approaches in reconfigurable flight control are generally divided
into two categories: those which incorporate multiple non-adaptive controllers and switch
between them based on the output of a fault detection and identification element and those
that employ a single adaptive controller capable of compensating for a variety of fault
modes. A limited number of fault-tolerant controllers combine these approaches thereby
creating a continuously adaptive control framework that profits from the fault detection and
identification process. Regardless of the approach for reconfigurable flight control, certain
fault modes dictate system restructuring in order to prevent a catastrophic failure. System
restructuring enables active control of actuation strategies not employed by the nominal
system to recover controllability of the aircraft. Active control of a helicopter’s main rotor
RPM exemplifies this sort of restructuring. After system restructuring, continued operation
of the aircraft in a degraded mode requires the generation of flight paths that adhere to an
altered flight envelope. Reconfigurable methods for flight path planning are less prevalent
in the literature. A comprehensive fault-tolerant control architecture for unmanned aerial
vehicles should include active system restructuring and a method to re-shape the desired
flight path of the aircraft.
xv
The control architecture developed in this research employs a multi-tiered hierarchy to
allow unmanned aircraft to generate and track safe flight paths despite the occurrence of po-
tentially catastrophic faults. The hierarchical architecture increases the level of autonomy of
the system by integrating five functionalities with the baseline system: fault detection and
identification, active system restructuring, reconfigurable flight control, reconfigurable path
planning, and mission adaptation. Fault detection and identification algorithms continually
monitor aircraft performance and issue fault declarations. When the severity of a fault
exceeds the capability of the baseline flight controller, the system actively restructures and
selects one of multiple reconfigurable flight controllers. System restructuring expands the
controllability of the aircraft using unconventional control strategies not exploited by the
baseline controller. Each of the reconfigurable flight controllers and the baseline controller
employ a proven adaptive neural network control strategy. The result is a suite of adaptive
controllers each capable of accommodating an entire range of faults. A reconfigurable path
planner employs an adaptive model of the vehicle to re-shape the desired flight path. Gen-
eration of the revised flight path is posed as a linear program constrained by the response
of the degraded system. Finally, a mission adaptation component estimates limitations on
the closed-loop performance of the aircraft and adjusts the aircraft mission accordingly.
Implementation of the fault-tolerant architecture on two separate unmanned helicopter
airframes validates the utility of the hierarchical architecture. Active system restructuring
includes active control of the main rotor RPM to accommodate faults in both collective and
cyclic control actuators. Flight test and simulation results demonstrate the functionality of
each component of the control architecture.
Major contributions of this research include:
• An integrated fault-tolerant architecture that incorporates fault detection and iden-
tification, active system restructuring, reconfigurable flight controllers, reconfigurable
path planning, and mission adaptation to optimize the usefulness of the aircraft.
• An active system restructuring component that maximizes vehicle performance in the
presence of a fault without degrading the performance of the nominal system.
xvi
• A suite of adaptive reconfigurable flight controllers with guaranteed stability proper-
ties that employ active control to augment the controllability of the degraded system.
• A reconfigurable path planning component that generates flight paths based on the
capability of the degraded system.
• An online system identification process designed to enhance path planning and aid
higher level decision making processes.
• A mission adaptation component that imposes constraints on the closed loop perfor-




Recent military actions around the world have underscored the potential utility of un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Yet, most of their successes have occurred in a setting that
allows a relatively large margin for error. UAVs have typically operated in flight profiles
that maintain a large separation from obstacles and from other aircraft. As their roles con-
tinue to expand, UAVs will operate in progressively more challenging environments where
this separation from flight hazards will be significantly reduced. Use of UAVs within the
national airspace will require them to operate at a reliability that approaches or exceeds
that of manned general aviation operations. General aviation averages one Class A mishap
per 100,000 flight hours.1 The Predator, which is currently the most reliable UAV in the
U.S. fleet, averages 20 such mishaps per 100,000 flight hours [2]. Military usage in the urban
warfare scenario calls for multiple UAVs operating simultaneously within the confines of an
urban landscape. Operation in this environment requires incredible precision despite ad-
verse flight conditions characterized by swirling winds and intermittent navigation signals.
Furthermore, the close proximity to humans dramatically increases the risk associated with
an in-flight mishap. The poor reliability of current unmanned vehicles presents a road-
block to their success in demanding new flight environments. The Office of the Secretary
of Defense recognized this shortcoming in the UAV Roadmap 2005-2030 identifying the de-
velopment of “self-repairing”, “smart” flight control systems as a crucial step in the overall
advancement of UAV autonomy [2].
The challenge of developing an advanced fault-tolerant control system for UAVs can be
approached on two levels. Modern UAVs are generally complicated, dynamic systems that
possess several inter-connected components as well as an onboard computational capabil-
ity. In this light, much research has been dedicated to the development of fault-tolerant
1Class A mishaps are those which result in a loss of aircraft, human life, or $1,000,000 in damage.
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controls for complex systems. Dr. N. Scott Clements recently investigated the applica-
tion of fault-tolerant control to a variety of complex dynamical systems [19]. His work
included limited experiments conducted on a single UAV. While Clements’ research does
provide a foundation for addressing the UAV problem, its generality overlooks some of
the details associated with unmanned flight. On another level, a UAV’s control system
should emulate a human pilot in its reaction to a fault condition. Of course, both in-
dustry and academia have devoted substantial research to improve the fault-tolerance of
piloted aircraft. Reconfigurable flight control of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles
has been an active area of research for several years. The research presented in sequel
bridges these non-conflicting approaches to fault-tolerance on UAVs. The fault-tolerant
control architecture developed by Clements’ is modified to address the specifics of the
UAV problem and to take advantage of recent accomplishments in reconfigurable flight
control.
1.1 Discussion of Terms and Assumptions
Failures and Faults - A failure is defined as the “termination of the ability of an item to
perform its specified function” [69]. In the context of this text, a failure is an event that
prevents a UAV from sustaining controlled flight operations. Faults are physical defects that
can precipitate a failure. Accordingly, the fault-tolerant control architecture developed in
this research strives to prevent a vehicle level failure despite the presence of fault conditions.
The architecture concerns itself specifically with faults that cause an unintended degradation
in the performance of the system. Such faults are incipient failures, and the fault-tolerant
control architecture acts to restore stability to the system. Table 1 copied from the UAV
Roadmap 2005-2030 attributes the majority of UAV failures to Power/Propulsion and Flight
Control.
Restructuring and Reconfiguration - Fault-tolerant controllers employ both system
restructuring and control reconfiguration to improve system performance in the presence
of a fault mode. Restructuring implies changing the inter-connections within the system
to achieve a new method of operation. Restructuring can occur in the system’s hardware
2








RQ-1A / Predator 23% 39% 11% 16% 11%
MQ-1B / Predator 53% 23% 10% 2% 12%
RQ-2A / Pioneer 29% 29% 19% 18% 5%
RQ-2B / Pioneer 51% 15% 13% 19% 2%
RQ-5A / Hunter* 38% 5% 31% 7% 19%
RQ-7 / Shadow 38% 0% 0% 38% 24%






or software. System restructuring typically dictates an associated control reconfiguration.
Reconfiguration involves adaptation within the control laws of the system. This use of the
terms coincides for the most part with Clements’ although other sources present conflicting
definitions [19, 29].
Active Control - Active control implies the use of unconventional control methods to
improve the controllability of a system. Active systems “change their characteristics in real-
time for better safety and higher efficiency” [66]. The control authorities employed in active
control are generally beyond the intent of the original system designer. Achieving active
control involves system restructuring, and the application of control efforts not employed
by the nominal system.
Waypoints and Flight Paths - In the simplest form, waypoints are specified spatial and
temporal locations for the vehicle. They command the vehicle to be in the proximity of a
certain point at a certain time. Human UAV operators often form missions for UAVs as
a sequence of waypoints, separated by several seconds up to minutes in time. Individual
waypoints commonly have parameters, such as a target velocity, associated with them to
facilitate path planning. Path planning algorithms translate waypoints into flight paths,
which connect waypoints and form a continuous sequence of position commands for vehicle.
Flight paths provide a command input for the low-level flight controllers at every time step.
Assumptions - The fault-tolerant control architecture for UAVs applies system restruc-
turing to address a pre-determined set of detectable faults. The architecture can also
3
accommodate select undetectable faults that do not require system restructuring. The ar-
chitecture also requires sufficient control authority in the fault-degraded system to recover
the aircraft. Depending on the vehicle, several categories of faults may meet these criteria;
however, this research addresses actuator malfunctions specifically. Actuator malfunctions
affect the aircraft in a complex manner that stimulates every component of the fault-tolerant
architecture. Most faults do not demand such a comprehensive modification to the control
architecture. Additionally, a large variety of actuator malfunctions are easily simulated in
flight without adding hardware to the airframe. On Table 1, actuator faults are classi-
fied under Flight Control. Flight Control also includes avionics, air data systems, control
surfaces, onboard software, and navigation packages [1].
To combat malfunctions in the flight control actuators, the fault-tolerant architecture
assumes the following actuator model:
δ = max[min(Kactδcom + b, δmax), δmin] (1)
where faults can affect the actuator effective gain Kact : 0 ≤ Kact ≤ 1, bias b, or satura-
tion levels, δmin and δmax. Faults, such as floating actuators where the parameters vary
constantly following the occurrence of the fault, are not considered. To accommodate these
cases, additional hardware on the vehicle could be employed to immobilize the actuator
creating a stuck actuator condition (Kact = 0).
1.2 Fault-Tolerant Control of Complex Systems
Large-scale systems such as manufacturing facilities, naval vessels, and aircraft generally
include several integrated systems and sub-systems. Along with multiple components, these
complex systems exhibit multiple modes of operation. Automated controllers oversee the
operation of the system and direct changes in the system mode of operation. Both the
environment and the health of the system can initiate undirected changes in system mode
of operation. When the cause of a disturbance is system health, fault-tolerant control
methods such as fault isolation, system restructuring, and control reconfiguration provide














































Figure 1. Clements’ hierarchical fault-tolerant control architecture.
5
Fault-tolerant control of complex dynamical systems requires the integration of several
functionalities and possibly several controllers in an adaptive control scheme. The complex-
ity of the integration process is simplified by the use of a multi-layer hierarchical control
scheme. Several researchers have implemented a very similar architecture [13, 19, 32]. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the fault-tolerant control architecture implemented by Clements [19]. Each
level of the control hierarchy adds autonomy to the architecture. The scheme is readily
expandable vertically and horizontally. In his architecture, fault detection and identifica-
tion (FDI) as well as fault isolation occurs at the third tier of the hierarchy. Fault isolation
includes restructuring to prevent propagation of the fault to healthy components. Following
fault isolation, the middle tier of the hierarchy conducts three tasks to optimize the system’s
response to a fault. First, the redistribution controller restructures system inter-connections
to optimize the use of control authority. “The goal of optimization [in the redistribution
controller] is to maximize the routing of control authority between the subsystems.” [19].
Then, based on the output of the redistribution controller, the set-point controller adjusts
the set-points of the low-level controllers. Finally, the low-level gain controller adjusts the
gains of the low-level controllers as necessary. Clements’ architecture includes all the es-
sential elements of a fault-tolerant control architecture at a level of generality that allows
its application to a wide variety of systems. However, implementing the architecture on
a specific system requires the development of algorithms to perform each of its separate
functions. In the case of UAVs, for instance, this development is non-trivial.
1.3 Fault-Tolerance Applied to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Comparing the reliability of UAVs to similar manned aircraft is a logical measure of their
performance. For the time being, human pilots far exceed the capability of unmanned
systems to react to changes in vehicle response. The goal of this research is to achieve a
level of reliability in UAVs that exceeds the capability of manned systems and is only limited
by the physical constraints of the vehicle. Analyzing the response of a human pilot to in-
flight emergencies is a natural starting point for constructing a more reliable unmanned
system.
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In the event of an emergency, human pilots act on experience and training to execute
a prescribed emergency procedure. Successful execution of that procedure requires first,
correct diagnosis of the malfunction and second, knowledge of a prescribed procedure to
restructure the system. In a simple example, a pilot reacts to an over-temperature in the
#2 engine– “Shutdown engine #2 and land as soon as practicable.” Successful completion
of this procedure, however, entails much more than cutting fuel flow to the bad engine. The
pilot must adjust control inputs and path planning so that the vehicle does not exceed its
degraded capability. He/she may have to execute emergency procedures or maneuvers not
conducted under normal operating conditions. To operate reliably the pilot must adapt to
changing conditions and make life-saving decisions.
By their nature, unmanned aircraft present many challenges for fault-tolerance not
found in manned systems. The most comprehensive sensor suites on UAVs cannot match
the awareness that a pilot provides his aircraft. This lack of awareness often slows detection
of a hazardous condition, but also affects the operation of the vehicle after the onset of
the fault. State of the art vision based systems cannot execute an emergency landing to
an unknown location. In the case of unmanned rotorcraft, conducting an autorotation to
even a known and well defined landing area has not been achieved. Another characteristic
of UAVs is a lack of redundancy; weight and cost savings often dictate the omission of
redundant components. Overcoming these UAV specific challenges and achieving a high
level of reliability requires that control systems in unmanned aircraft emulate the following
procedures of human pilots:
1. Quickly and accurately diagnose hazardous conditions.
2. Restructure the aircraft in accordance with a prescribed emergency procedure.
3. Adapt control inputs to accommodate for the degraded control response of the aircraft.
4. Constrain flight paths within the capability of the degraded system.
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5. Decide on a course of action:
• Land as soon as possible - land at the nearest suitable landing area (e.g. open
field) without delay.
• Land as soon as practicable - land at a suitable landing area with primary con-
sideration given to the urgency of the emergency.
• Continue the mission in a degraded mode.
These procedures closely parallel the functions of Clements’ fault-tolerant control architec-
ture. The first item corresponds directly with the fault detection and identification com-
ponent. The restructuring considered in the second item is accomplished in the high level
of the Clements’ hierarchy during fault isolation. The redistribution controller component
in the middle level conducts additional system restructuring. The third item corresponds
with the low-level gain controller from Clements’ architecture although adaptation may also
occur within the low-level or local controllers. In some cases, the third item may necessitate
switching to entirely different local controllers. Achieving the fourth item above requires
augmentation to the Clements’ architecture. His architecture does include a set-point con-
troller, but that component is designed to produce new trim values for the local controllers,
not a continuous flight path. Generating a flight path that the impaired aircraft can track
is a more difficult, yet achievable, task. The fifth task requires a higher level of autonomy
that is not accounted for in Clements’ architecture although it could be expanded vertically
to accommodate such functionality.
1.4 Plant Descriptions
The fault-tolerant control architecture developed in this research was implemented on two
unmanned helicopters: the GTMax and the Renegade UAV. Actual flight testing was con-
ducted on the GTMax. Although the research includes no results on fixed-wing aircraft, it is
applicable to unmanned aerial vehicles in general– fixed or rotary-wing. The two helicopters
used in testing differ greatly in both size and complexity.
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Figure 2. GTMax in flight.
Figure 3. Renegade UAV, a derivative of the Robinson R22.
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1.4.1 GTMax
The GTMax (Figure 2) is an automated version of Yamaha’s RMax, a remotely controlled
helicopter weighing 128 pounds empty with a 10-foot rotor diameter. The rotor system
includes a fly bar, and its main rotor blades are rigidly mounted to the mast. Modifications
to the base airframe include the addition of two flight computers, an inertial measurement
unit, a differential global positioning system, a magnetometer, a sonar, multiple datalinks,
and an optical rotor RPM sensor. The optical RPM sensor offers greater precision than the
unmodified RMax sensor. The aircraft weighs approximately 160 pounds in its test config-
uration. The GTMax was a primary research platform for the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) Software Enabled Control (SEC) [36] and Heterogeneous Urban
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Team (HURT) projects.
1.4.2 Renegade UAV
The Renegade UAV (Figure 3), operated by the Boeing Company, is a derivative of the
Robinson R22 [3]. Researchers constructed it as a surrogate for the A160 Hummingbird.
Unlike the GTMax, the Renegade has a teetering rotor system and no fly bar. The Renegade
weighs approximately 1350 pounds with a 25-foot rotor diameter. It is the primary research
platform for the SEC Renegade program, an extension to the SEC program intended to
apply SEC technologies to a full-scale unmanned helicopter. The experiments supporting
this research were conducted in a Renegade simulation environment developed at Georgia
Tech [24]. The same simulation environment was used in preparation for actual flight
tests during the SEC Renegade program. The vehicle model included in the simulation was
validated by comparison to actual flight data. Additional information on the SEC Renegade
program is available in [24].
1.5 Overview
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current technologies in fault-tolerant control with an
emphasis on the application of reconfigurable flight control algorithms to UAVs. Chapter 3
introduces the fault-tolerant control architecture. Fault detection and identification is also
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described in Chapter 3. The next four chapters provide additional detail on individual
components of the fault-tolerant control architecture. Chapter 4 discusses adaptive neural
networks for reconfigurable flight control and control restructuring on rotorcraft. It includes
flight test results on the GTMax. Chapter 5 describes the active system restructuring com-
ponent in detail and provides additional flight test results on the GTMax. Reconfigurable
path planning is the topic of Chapter 6; it includes simulation results for the GTMax.
Chapter 7 pertains to mission adaptation and includes simulation results on the Renegade
UAV as well as the GTMax. Finally, Chapter 8 provides conclusions and recommended




The pursuit of improved safety and reliability in the aerospace industry has produced several
approaches for fault-tolerant control. Early results tended to employ robust, non-adaptive
control systems. More recent developments in fault-tolerant control have included adaptive
controllers which employ combinations of system restructuring and reconfigurable flight
control. Again, restructuring implies an online modification to the inter-connections in
the control system. In a car, for instance, the driver typically decelerates using the brake
pedal, but in an emergency the hand brake and downshifting are alternate methods to
slow the vehicle. Reconfigurable flight control implies online adaptation to the control
law. In the simplest case, reconfigurable flight control entails gain scheduling based on
the fault condition of the aircraft. Reconfigurable flight control has produced a handful of
successful flight tests, mostly on fixed wing aircraft [64, 78]. Research also provides a basis
for reconfigurable control of manned and unmanned helicopters [18, 26, 54, 81]. Both control
restructuring and reconfigurable flight control follow the intent of the UAV Roadmap when
it advocates the development “smart” and “self-repairing” control systems [2].
2.1 Non-adaptive Systems
Non-adaptive control systems provide fault-tolerance without reconfiguration or restructur-
ing. Reliable control is achieved through the selection of a fixed control law that accommo-
dates a set of fault modes while maintaining guaranteed stability properties. Non-adaptive
control systems are attractive for two reasons. First, they do not require fault detection
and identification (FDI). Second, the fixed control laws are easily implemented [47]. On
the other hand, non-adaptive control systems cannot provide an optimal control law for the
unimpaired condition and all possible vehicle fault conditions. The result is sub-optimal
performance in all modes. The design of so-called reliable control systems is typically
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accomplished using H2 or H∞ control techniques or using sliding mode control (SMC).
Applying SMC to the reconfigurable flight control problem as with other applications has
a tendency to produce highly active control signals. Use of a boundary layer on the sliding
surface is one method to damp control chattering [35]. Robust control techniques generally
result in smoother control signals. A recent H2 method uses linear matrix inequalities to
construct a fault-tolerant flight controller with guaranteed tracking performance [46]. The
controller was able to accommodate pre-determined faults at the expense of degradation in
the performance of the unimpaired system. This work also demonstrates that the design
of non-adaptive control systems becomes complicated even for linear systems. Nonetheless,
the idea of accommodating multiple fault modes with a single controller is appealing.
2.2 Adaptive Systems
Assembling multiple individually non-adaptive control systems and switching between them
based on system fault condition is a logical advance to the control methodology. The result-
ing control system can tolerate a large range of faults without degrading the nominal system
performance. In addition to multiple reconfigurable controllers, the system requires an FDI
capability to switch between the various controllers. These techniques to construct recon-
figurable controllers assume that a model of the post-fault system is available during design.
The most common methods are the pseudo-inverse method, eigenstructure assignment, and
optimal control.
The pseudo-inverse method attempts to recover the performance of the nominal system
by computing an approximate matrix inverse. Given a linear system:
ẋ = Ax + Bu
y = Cx (2)
where A ∈ <n×n, B ∈ <n×m, C ∈ <o×n. The control u = Kx where K ∈ <m×n results in
the following closed loop system:
ẋ = (A + BK)x
y = Cx. (3)
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The post-fault system has the following model:
ẋf = Afxf + Bfu
yf = Cxf . (4)
With Af and Bf stabilizable, the gain matrix Kf can be computed to stabilize the system,
ẋf = (Af + BfKf )xf
yf = Cxf . (5)
The pseudo-inverse method selects Kf to minimize:
J(Kf ) = ||(A + BK)− (Af + BfKf )||F (6)
where ||.||F indicates the Frobenius norm [29]. This choice of Kf seeks to bring the dynamics
of the impaired system close to those of the unimpaired system. The solution to Equation 6
is found using the pseudo-inverse of Bf ,
Kf = B+f (A + BK −Af ) (7)
Difficulties can arise when Bf is not of full row rank. Gao and Antsaklis present a method
to generate a Kf that maintains stability of the closed loop system in this case [29]. By
integrating FDI into his control design, Bos̆ković advanced the pseudo-inverse methodology.
His reconfigurable flight controller applies an implementation of multiple models, switching
and tuning (MMST) [12]. The system includes a set of models of the plant dynamics with
a fixed pseudo-inverse controller for each model. The controller selects the model that most
closely approximates the actual plant dynamics and activates the corresponding controller.
Assuming that the actual plant dynamics are sufficiently close to at least one of the models;
that each model has at least one stabilizing controller; and that proper switching between
the models occurs, the system will stabilize the plant. By applying certain constraints to
the switching logic, the designer can ensure proper switching.
Eigenstructure assignment is another method to generate a gain matrix, Kf , that sta-
bilizes the post-fault system (Equation 4). This method is based on the notion that the
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response of a closed loop linear system is determined by the location of its eigenvalues and
the direction of the associated eigenvectors. Kf is chosen to locate the eigenvalues of the
closed loop system at the desired locations (or in desired regions). Any remaining degree
of freedom in the gain matrix, Kf is used to minimize the distance between the achieved
eigenvectors and a desired set of eigenvectors [42, 71, 85]. This minimization problem is
more complex than the pseudo-inverse method, but it achieves a better response from the
impaired system particularly when an explicit pseudo-inverse for Bf does not exist. Us-
ing eigenstructure assignment in a MMST reconfigurable flight controller is, of course, also
possible [86].
Successful implementation of both the pseudo-inverse method and eigenstructure assign-
ment requires the control designer to address control saturation. Matching the performance
of the nominal system is often not possible in the presence of a fault. Attempting to re-
cover the nominal performance in this case will result in control saturations. Of course,
the post-fault system cannot provide a desired linear response in the presence of control
saturations. Bodson suggests four command limiting techniques that recover a degree of
stability in the event of control saturation [8]. Implicit model following (IMF) is another
method to avoid control saturations. Under IMF control, the aircraft tracks a reference
model specified by the control designer. In an adaptive control scheme, the designer can
designate different reference models for each fault mode. The reference models can be cho-
sen to reduce or avoid control saturation. In one instance of this control methodology, a
reconfigurable flight controller employing model following and the pseudo-inverse method
demonstrated fault-tolerance on a tandem rotor helicopter simulation [18].
Optimal control techniques offer a more refined method to alleviate control saturation
in the post-fault system. Model predictive control (MPC) generates optimal control inputs
to minimize a cost function, for instance the integrated tracking error. The designer can im-
plement various constraints during the optimization including position and rate saturations
on the control inputs. Receding horizon MPC produces an optimal control sequence for a
finite receding time interval. The first control in that sequence is applied to the system. The
primary drawback of MPC is the computation required to solve the optimization problem.
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In [10], Bos̆ković details a MMST strategy for a fault-tolerant reconfigurable controller that
incorporates MPC. The work parallels [12] with model predictive controllers replacing the
pseudo-inverse controllers.
All the approaches to reconfigurable flight control discussed thus far have included a
discrete set of controllers and an FDI capability. The MMST architecture discussed above
employs one method for FDI, but it requires off-line modeling of system fault modes. Op-
timal filters offer another means for detecting incipient faults on UAVs such as icing [49].
Sequential Monte Carlo methods or particle filters were also applied to FDI on UAVs [75].
The Fault-Adaptive Control Technology (FACT) employs hybrid bonded graphs to model
individual components of the system [4]. This method has been applied to manned aircraft
as well as unmanned rotorcraft. Another technique that has been successfully applied to
rotorcraft employs static neural networks which are trained off-line using previous flight
and simulation data [21, 22]. System identification, which is discussed in Appendix A, can
provide additional information for the FDI process [25].
A separate variety of adaptive reconfigurable flight controllers achieves fault-tolerance
without dependence on FDI. These controllers typically include a single adaptive controller
that can accommodate a range of disturbances, including fault modes, without switching.
Because these controllers preclude switching, the interaction between the FDI algorithm
and the reconfigurable controller is no longer a consideration for stability. The adaptation
is typically driven by an estimation process that excludes prior knowledge of fault modes.
Adaptive controllers of this sort are generally divided into two categories. Direct adaptive
control systems attempt to learn control parameters. Indirect adaptive control systems
learn parameters of the plant. They commonly employ system identification to estimate
a linear model of the plant. Indirect adaptive control then uses the learned model to
form a control law. In a sense, FDI-based reconfigurable flight controllers are indirect
adaptive possesses that employ a specific form of system identification. Both direct and
indirect adaptive controllers draw information from the response of the system. The process
requires persistency of excitation. Put simply, the signals of the system must contain a
sufficient level of information. Sastry provides an analytical explanation for persistency of
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excitation [63]. Some authors designate a third category of adaptive reconfigurable flight
controllers, self organizing maps (SOMs) [76]. SOMs use neural methods to learn the best
control inputs. The learning process usually includes extensive off-line training, but the
result is an intelligent, adaptive reconfigurable flight controller.
Indirect adaptive control is appealing because the control process generates useful in-
formation about the plant. Flight path planning, FDI, and flight controllers can all utilize
the estimated plant model. Furthermore, all the conventional control methods including
the pseudo-inverse method, eigenstructure assignment, and optimal control are available to
the control designer. Indirect adaptive control depends on the principle of certainty equiva-
lence [45]. Uncertain plant parameters are estimated using a system identification process,
and those estimates are used in a control law to stabilize of the plant. Due to certainty
equivalence, indirect methods cannot accommodate large uncertainties in the plant para-
meters. Bos̆ković states that indirect adaptive reconfigurable flight controllers can handle
only a very limited class of failures [10]. State of the art system identification methods are
able to reduce uncertainty in the plant parameters, and the indirect method is commonly
used in fault-tolerant control. Indirect adaptive methods that employ receding horizon
MPC are common [56, 76]. In one instance, this methodology achieved fault-tolerance on
a vertical take off and landing UAV with positive simulation results. Gutièrrez presented
a control methodology called adaptive mode transition control (AMTC) [32, 72, 73]. The
AMTC architecture enables smooth transition between multiple modes of operation. Mode
transition control allows the controller to retain non-local learning. Each mode has an as-
sociated indirect adaptive optimal controller. A clear advantage of the indirect method is
the availability of optimal control strategies to the control designer.
Direct adaptive control estimates control parameters, not parameters of the plant. The
control parameters are immediately useful in the construction of the control vector. Multi-
variable adaptive control, adaptive neural networks, variable structure control, and adaptive
loop-shaping are some of the adaptive control techniques applicable to the reconfigurable
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flight control problem. Of these, adaptive loop-shaping is the most primitive, but its foun-
dation in conventional linear control makes it a simple choice for reconfigurable flight con-
trol [34]. Bodson proposed a multi-variable model reference adaptive controller for square
systems [7]. He compared three implementations of the controller: indirect adaptive, direct
adaptive input error, and direct adaptive output error. All three implementations achieved
the control objective, but after comparison the direct adaptive input error controller was
selected based on stability considerations. Given the inherent robustness of SMC, applying
adaptation to SMC methods is another natural choice for reconfigurable flight control. Two
methods of adaptation include boundary layer reconfiguration and variable structure con-
trol [11, 67]. Both methods provide a means to improve the performance of a non-adaptive
SMC controller.
Direct adaptive neural network control is a proven technique to control non-linear sys-
tems. The method was selected for use on the Air Force sponsored Reconfigurable Control
for a Tailless Fighter Aircraft (RESTORE) program because it has “the ability to stabilize
the vehicle following failures / damage” despite model uncertainties [15]. The RESTORE
program employed a direct adaptive neural network flight controller in parallel with on-
line system identification [14, 17]. The system identification estimated control derivatives
for control allocation, not for indirect adaptive flight control. Adaptive neural network
flight controllers employ adaptation to cancel model inversion errors; fault modes manifest
themselves as model inversion errors. By adaptively canceling the model error, the system
is forced to track a desired reference model. Update laws for the neural networks with
guaranteed stability qualities are available [48]. Johnson developed pseudo-control hedg-
ing for adaptive neural network controllers [37]. Pseudo-control hedging (PCH) allows the
controller to continue adaptation despite control saturation. Kannan extended PCH to a
cascaded inner / outer loop structure for the control of an unmanned rotorcraft [39]. The
controller employs adaptive neural networks for dynamic inversion in both the inner and
outer control loops. The reference model for the inner loop is modified by control satura-
tions in order to protect the adaptive process. The outer loop reference model is modified
by inner loop performance. Proctor compensated for latency in Kannan’s controller using
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direct compensation and a Smith predictor [61].
Self organizing maps add human-like, neural intelligence to the control process. SOMs
are able to remember the response of the system in previous flight conditions. They use
this memory to determine the best control for a given situation. Like human pilots, SOM
flight controllers require extensive training. Dynamic neural programming was used to gen-
erate a reconfigurable flight controller for a combat helicopter [27, 28]. This reconfigurable
controller employed the constructed mapping to find control solutions for a fault-impaired
aircraft. Recursive pseudo-linear regression and dynamic cell structures are other means to
update aircraft neuro-controllers [31, 41]. Dynamic cell structures are an extension of SOMs
that allow the network to grow and shrink. The NASA Intelligent Flight Control System
(IFCS) project employed dynamic cell structures to learn control derivatives from online sys-
tem identification [50, 70]. Krishnakumar defined four levels (Level 0 - Level 3) of intelligent
control for aircraft [44]. Level 0 describes non-adaptive robust feedback controllers. Level
1 describes adaptive reconfigurable flight controllers. Level 2 describes adaptive controllers
that optimize their performance over time. Finally, Level 3 controllers include a higher level
planning function that accounts for contingencies. None of the controllers referenced thus
far achieve Level 3.
All the adaptive control methods reviewed to this point have employed reconfiguration,
not restructuring to achieve their objectives. Restructuring implies adapting the inter-
connections that define the operation of a system [19]. This adaptation creates a modified
system that achieves its control objectives by less conventional means. For instance, varying
the main rotor RPM of a helicopter provides a means for restructuring that can accommo-
date collective actuator faults [43, 81, 83]. This restructuring connects the engine throttle
control to a reconfigurable flight controller that generates a variable set point for the main
rotor RPM. Osder addressed similar restructuring strategies in a framework of redundancy
management [53]. Fixed wing methods include the use of engine thrust to create a pitching
moment; the 1989 DC-10 accident in Sioux City, Iowa was referenced. Another fixed wing
method is individual control of ganged control surfaces, typically ailerons. For single main
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rotor helicopters, a novel technique for control restructuring involves applying a transforma-
tion to the swashplate control inputs [54]. Helicopters constructed with canted tail rotors
or stabilators possess additional redundancy for pitch control [26]. Other techniques for
restructuring rotorcraft include individual blade control and main rotor blade servo flap
control [33]. All these methods for restructuring implement a fundamental change in the
way the system operates.
Control allocation is a related problem that exists in systems with over-actuation. Con-
trol allocation seeks to find an optimal control when the dimension of the control vector u
is greater that the dimension of the output vector y (Equation 2). The primary objective of
control allocation is to achieve a desired output from the plant. Considering control satu-
rations, this problem may have infinite solutions, a unique solution, or no feasible solution.
In the infinite solution case, control allocation can achieve a variety of auxiliary objec-
tives such as minimized control movement or control deflection. Certain control allocation
schemes generate control vectors that enhance system identification [16, 20]. Restructuring
commonly produces systems that benefit from control allocation. Variations on the pseudo-
inverse method provide a relatively simple method for control allocation [5, 58]. Other
methods formulate the problem as a linear or quadratic program and solve it using common
techniques such as the simplex or interior point methods [60]. Modeling the problem off-line
can reduce the online optimization time [6].
2.3 Flight Path Planning
Most UAV flight controllers include a flight path planner of some kind. Path planners,
sometimes referred to as trajectory generators or outer loop controllers, generate a desired
flight path for the vehicle. The flight path is a sequence of time-stamped position or velocity
commands for the low-level controller. Path planners generally create flight paths that are
sufficiently conservative so that tracking is not problematic for the low-level controller.
Linear low-level flight controllers generally require flight paths designed so that the aircraft
does not encounter significant non-linear dynamics. Low-level flight controllers often contain
internal reference models that are generated from their command inputs. The reference
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models internal to the low-level controller are not synonymous with the flight path. The
flight path is created at a higher level in the control architecture. For an unimpaired
vehicle, generation of an appropriately conservative trajectory is not difficult. A stationary
linear model is usually suitable to create the flight trajectory. After the onset of a fault,
however, the capabilities of the vehicle are partially unknown. This makes the generation
of attainable flight trajectories problematic. Pseudo-control hedging allows the aircraft to
remain stable in control saturation [40, 39]. Adaptive limit detection and avoidance used
alone or in conjunction with PCH can ensure that the aircraft does not exceed complex
nonlinear limits [82]. Limit avoidance protects the aircraft from exceeding its capabilities,
but neither limit avoidance nor PCH removes the necessity for attainable flight trajectories.
The process of generating attainable post-fault trajectories is most easily addressed in two
steps: 1) model the effects of the failure, 2) conduct online trajectory generation [52]. The
first step entails an online system identification process and/or accessing à priori knowledge
of the capabilities of the damaged vehicle. The second step entails generating an acceptable
flight path given the effects of the fault mode. Switching to a pre-determined linear model
for flight path generation after the onset of a specific fault is one implementation of this
process [88]. More complex algorithms use online optimization and MPC to generate flight
paths [23, 55, 56]. Most recently, a developmental intelligent control architecture for UAVs is
planned to incorporate a reconfigurable finite-automaton-based path planning approach [74,
78]. A portion of the technique is computationally expensive and conducted in non-real-
time. A variation of this approach stores optimization results that are generated offline in a
polynomial neural network which can be accessed in real-time [64]. Flight tests on the Total
In-Flight Simulator (TIFS) validated the approach for use on a re-useable launch vehicle
such as the X-40A. Johnson presented additional results where fault-tolerant guidance was
applied to a re-useable launch vehicle [38]. Nonetheless, the area of post-fault trajectory
generation is largely unexplored.
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2.4 Conclusions
Despite the vast amount of research that has been conducted on fault-tolerance and recon-
figurable flight control for UAVs, several shortcomings still exist. Adaptive neural network
controllers are very capable at accommodating certain classes of malfunctions, but other
fault modes are not accommodated without system restructuring. Furthermore, the major-
ity of reconfigurable flight control research seeks to recover the performance of the nominal
system. Depending on the severity of the fault condition, recovery of the unimpaired per-
formance is not a realistic goal. The current research lacks adaptive, reconfigurable path
planning algorithms. The subsequent chapter and the remainder of this research develop
a fault-tolerant control architecture with the objective of maximizing the utility of UAVs
before and after the occurrence of a fault. Drawing from the literature survey in this chap-
ter as well as the discussions in Chapter 1, the following elements are shortfalls of many
otherwise suitable architectures.
A suitable fault-tolerant control architecture should:
1. Not degrade the performance of the aircraft prior to the declaration of a fault.
2. Optimize utilization of the aircraft after the declaration a fault.
3. Provide a means for accommodating known and unknown fault modes.
4. Employ prior knowledge of fault modes to minimize response time after the occurrence
of a fault.
5. Develop knowledge of the aircraft condition for higher level control processes.
The architecture developed in this research addresses each of these elements by integrating
active system restructuring, multiple adaptive neural network controllers, reconfigurable




The fault-tolerant control architecture developed in this chapter is designed to accommo-
date multiple fault modes with no degradation to the performance of the vehicle before
the occurrence of a fault and minimal degradation to the performance after the occurrence
of a fault. The goal of the proposed architecture is to expand the usable envelope of the
aircraft towards the physical limits of the degraded airframe. The architecture improves
reliability by integrating reconfigurable flight control, reconfigurable path planning, and
mission adaptation. An active system restructuring component supports this integration.
Clements’ hierarchical control architecture serves as a foundation for this architecture, but
this architecture specifically addresses UAVs. Figure 4 depicts the objective of the fault-
tolerant control architecture in expanding the capability of UAVs. This depiction is based
on a graphic first presented by the Draper Laboratory during the DARPA SEC project.
However, the SEC graphic did not include Degraded Capability arcs. The degraded arcs
shift the performance capability of the aircraft towards the origin based on the severity
of the fault mode. The reduction in performance indicated by these arcs complicates the
fault-tolerant control process because their location is not definitively known. Prior knowl-
edge about relevant fault modes and system identification provide a means to estimate the
degraded capability of the aircraft.
Figure 5 depicts the hierarchical fault-tolerant control architecture designed specifically
to achieve the objective depicted in Figure 4. Referring to Figure 5, the asterisk indicates
components implemented during previous research as part of the baseline control archi-
tecture [39]. The current architecture adds several components and functionalities to the
baseline architecture and to Clements’ architecture (Figure 1). Reconfigurable path plan-































Figure 4. Fault-tolerant control (FTC) objective graphic.
system restructuring component replaces the low-level gain controller and the redistribu-
tion controller. The system identification component is an addition, and the reconfigurable
flight controllers now augment the baseline controller as local controllers in Clements’ ter-
minology. As with the previous architecture, each level of the hierarchy adds autonomy to
the vehicle. The architecture is readily expandable vertically as well as horizontally.
The reconfigurable flight controllers and the baseline flight controller reside at the lowest
tier of the hierarchy. This layer generates actuator control inputs to achieve a desired
flight path. The baseline controller and each of the reconfigurable flight controllers employ
adaptive neural networks to provide robustness to uncertainties such as an unidentified
fault condition. The reconfigurable flight controllers are not included in the control loop
unless activated in reaction to a fault declaration. The low-level controllers are immediately
subordinate to the second tier functions.
The second tier receives a sequence of waypoints from the third tier, and it generates
a vehicle flight path. It also directs system restructuring in response to fault conditions.
When the fault detection and identification component issues a fault declaration, the active
system restructuring component sends restructuring instructions to functions at each tier
of the hierarchy. In the second tier, the reconfigurable path planning component employs



































































































Figure 5. Fault-tolerant control architecture. * indicates components implemented during
previous research as part of the baseline control architecture [39].
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optimize flight paths for the aircraft.
The human mission commander interfaces with the third tier of the architecture. The
human operator typically assigns missions to the vehicle in the form of waypoints. Way-
points are a specified spatial and temporal location for the vehicle. They command the
vehicle to be in the proximity of a certain point at a certain time. Missions for the aircraft
are formed as a sequence of waypoints, and either the baseline or reconfigurable path planner
generates a continuous flight path from a finite set of waypoints. The mission adaptation
component adjusts the assigned waypoints based on the condition of the aircraft after the
occurrence of a fault. Higher levels of autonomy, not included in the current architecture,
could interact with the third tier of the hierarchy.
Analytically, the objective of fault-tolerant control architecture is to optimize the utility
of the vehicle:
J(M, R) = U(Pe, M, Mcom) (8)
where U is a cost function that quantifies the usefulness of the vehicle to accomplish its
mission. U is a function of Pe, actually Pe(Fm,R), which is a measure of the closed loop
performance of the aircraft based on the fault mode Fm of the aircraft as well as any re-
structuring / reconfiguration R applied to the system. Fm is a vector of indicator variables
that characterizes the fault modes detected on the aircraft; R is a vector of indicator vari-
ables that characterizes all restructuring applied to the system. Mcom describes the mission
assigned to the aircraft, a sequence of waypoints. M allows the fault-tolerant control ar-
chitecture, specifically the mission adaptation component, to modify the parameters of the
assigned waypoints based on vehicle performance, Pe. These parameters include the nomi-
nal jerks, accelerations, and velocities used by the path planners. To resolve Equation 8, the
active system restructuring component optimizes performance over R. Then, the mission
adaptation component optimizes utility over M . In generating this sub-optimal solution,
the control architecture assumes that aircraft restructuring and reconfiguration can occur
without consideration of the vehicle’s mission. Indeed, most restructuring actions taken by
pilots in manned aircraft do not depend on the mission profile.
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The fault-tolerant control architecture employs active system restructuring to accommo-
date pre-determined faults that meet the assumptions discussed in Chapter 1. Furthermore,
adaptation in all three tiers of the hierarchy allows the architecture to accommodate cer-
tain undetected fault modes and even fault modes that are incorrectly identified. The
baseline controller and the reconfigurable flight controllers employ a direct adaptive control
strategy. The reconfigurable path planning component conducts indirect adaptive guid-
ance. Finally, the mission adaptation component modifies waypoint parameters as needed.
Frequency separation between the tiers of the hierarchy prevents interaction between the
adaptive processes. The combination of adaptation and active system restructuring for pre-
determined faults allows the architecture to respond quickly to known faults without losing
the capability to cope with unknown fault modes. Flight test results on the GTMax demon-
strate that the fault-tolerant architecture can accommodate four separate stuck actuator
malfunctions with the effective gain Kact reduced to zero (Equation 1).
3.1 Fault Detection and Identification
The success of the fault-tolerant control architecture depends greatly on the success of its
FDI routine. Detection and identification of a fault must occur quickly, that is within a few
seconds, or the degraded system will readily depart from the flight envelope of the intended
reconfigurable flight controller. A small number of false positives are usually acceptable;
however, false negatives and mis-identifications can result in the loss of the aircraft. The
instability that results from switching between various control strategies is also a concern
for FDI. Finally, FDI routines must be robust in design so that neither adverse environ-
mental conditions nor aggressive flight trajectories degrade their performance. Two FDI
designs were integrated with the fault-tolerant control architecture, and each demonstrated
specific advantages. A state-dependent algorithm detected faults based solely on vehicle
flight dynamics. The second was sensor-dependent; it employed sensors to monitor aircraft
hardware and detect faults. Of course, a variety of FDI algorithms are available in both
categories. The remainder of the section provides specifics on the algorithms that were
implemented here.
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Figure 6. Block diagram of the state-based FDI algorithm as implemented by Clements
and Saha [19, 21].
The state-dependent FDI routine employed a neural network trained off-line using actual
and simulated flight data. The neural network analyzed the vehicle’s state and control
vectors to detect the occurrence of a malfunction. In effect, it compared the vehicle response
to the expected response given the previous control inputs. Implementation of this technique
required no additional sensors. On the other hand, this technique was limited by the richness
and the expanse of the training data. For the algorithm to function properly, the training
set must include data over a wide range of flight profiles and environmental conditions. This
obstacle was surmountable as demonstrated by the flight results.
At the heart of this technique for FDI was a multi-layer feed-forward neural network.
The FDI system is depicted as a block diagram in Figure 6. The neural network was trained
off-line by back propagation using both simulation and flight data to finalize the weights.
The training goal was to minimize the mean square error between the network output and
the actual fault flag. The network had an output for each pre-determined fault mode. The
input vector was chosen so that it presented a significant correlation with the fault modes
under investigation. The input signals were passed through a low pass filter to enhance the
signature fault trends. To improve the rejection of false positives and increase confidence in
the method, a thresholding condition was imposed on the network outputs. Once sufficiently
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trained, the network was used for real-time fault detection. This FDI routine was the result
of collaboration with Dr. N. Scott Clements and Bhaskar Saha [19, 21].
If sensors are available on the flight control actuators, sensor-dependent FDI is prefer-
able. Response time is generally improved as well as accuracy in fault identification. Sensor-
based FDI has an additional benefit. It directly provides the state of the faulty component.
Reconfiguration to accommodate certain actuator malfunctions requires exact knowledge
of the faulty actuator’s position. Architectures that employ state-dependent FDI can over-
come this shortcoming by implementing hardware that locks faulty actuators in a prescribed
location once a fault occurs. The Fault-Adaptive Control Technology (FACT) developed
at Vanderbilt University [4] employed bonded graphs to detect and precisely identify faults
in three flight control actuators on the GTMax. Nagabhushan Mahadevan of the Institute
for Software Integrated Systems at Vanderbilt University developed the FACT FDI routine
flown on the GTMax.
3.2 System Identification
Unlike the Clements’ architecture, the architecture developed in this research includes a
separate system identification component. The system identification component produces
a model of the open-loop plant for use by other components within the architecture. The
low-level flight controllers do not use the output of the system identification component
to generate their control laws, but the reconfigurable path planner does use the model to
generate flight paths. Likewise, the mission adaptation component depends on the output
of the system identification component in order to estimate the capability of the closed
loop system. Higher level algorithms rely on closed loop performance estimates to conduct
mission planning. Individual components of the architecture can infer a great deal of in-
formation on the dynamics of a degraded system from the output of the FDI component.
However, at least in the case of UAVs, additional system identification is required to further
characterize the response of the impaired system. The architecture developed here allows
the designer considerable freedom in selecting the algorithms that reside within the FDI
and system identification components. Clearly, the output to the FDI component can aid
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the system identification process. Depending on the algorithms implemented, the system
identification component can also assist the FDI process. Appendix A outlines a variety
of system identification processes for estimating the linear stability and control derivatives
that form the Af and Bf matrices of Equation 4.
3.3 Software Implementation
ONBOARD #2, 800 MHz, QNX, OCP 













































































































































Figure 7. Software implementation on the GTMax.
The fault-tolerant control architecture can reside on a single or multiple onboard proces-
sors. The design depicted below (Figure 7) employs the primary and secondary processors
installed on the GTMax to divide the computation. In this implementation, the left half of
Figure 7 resides on the primary onboard computer, onboard #1. Onboard #1 conducts all
the baseline control functions; these functions operate at 50 Hz using the QNX real-time
operating system. Additionally, onboard #1 includes a portion of the active system restruc-
turing functionality which interfaces the fault-tolerant control architecture with the baseline
control functions in addition to its other functions. One benefit of this implementation is
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that the onboard #1 code is largely unchanged by the integration of the fault-tolerant
control architecture. The flight path optimization conducted by the reconfigurable path
planner is computationally the most expense process. This component as well as the other
components depicted on the right half of Figure 7 reside on onboard #2. On onboard
#2, the reconfigurable flight controllers, the FDI, and the system identification components
operate at 25 Hz. Operating these functions at 25 Hz as opposed the 50 Hz affords the re-
configurable path planner time to operate consistently at 2.5 Hz. Slowing the reconfigurable
flight controllers to 25 Hz did not cause a consequential degradation in performance.
3.3.1 Fault Injection
During simulation and actual flight testing actuator faults were injected using software, not
hardware. Referencing Figure 7, faults were injected between the baseline controller and
the vehicle interface. Faults were simulated by changing Kact and/or b using Equation 1.
Injecting faults at the bottom of the architecture ensures that every component of the
architecture is properly stimulated by the occurrence of a fault.
3.3.2 The Open Control Platform
At times, flight testing on both the GTMax and the Renegade employed the Open Control
Platform (OCP) although the fault-tolerant control architecture does not necessitate its
use. The OCP is a Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) based software
infrastructure designed to facilitate real-time processing on UAVs [65]. It was developed
during the DARPA SEC program by Boeing Phantom Works, the Georgia Institute of
Technology, Honeywell Laboratories, and the University of California at Berkeley. The
OCP participated in several successful flight tests on various fixed and rotary-wing platforms
during the SEC program. Most recently, the OCP enabled successful flight testing of path
planning and low-level control algorithms on the Renegade UAV [24].
The OCP provides an open run-time framework that supports multiple control processes
running on a single processor or divided across multiple processors. The architecture can
extend this interoperability to multiple vehicles as well. A controls application program-
mer interface (API) raises the level of abstraction so that functions of the CORBA based
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architecture are accessible for controls engineers. Using the controls API, control designers
can employ the full capability of the OCP to restructure system inter-connections in real-
time [80]. This capability makes the OCP particularly suitable for fault-tolerant control.
All fault-tolerant control software that Georgia Tech developed during SEC program
including the results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 benefited from the OCP infrastructure.
For these flight tests, the onboard #2 processes were compiled in the OCP framework
(Figure 7). The OCP enabled seamless real-time communication with the onboard #1
components even though they were not compiled in the OCP framework. The results in
Chapters 6 and 7 did not use the OCP. For these results, processing on the onboard #2
machine was scheduled so that the fast processes (25 Hz) were manually prioritized over




The first tier of the fault-tolerant control architecture (Figure 5), as implemented on the
GTMax, includes five reconfigurable flight controllers. This total includes the baseline flight
controller which is actually a reconfigurable flight controller capable of accommodating a
broad range of faults [15]. The reconfigurable flight controller component includes four
additional controllers; each of these is associated with a particular category of fault. The five
adaptive neural network controllers combine to extend the fault-tolerance of the architecture
across a wide-range of possible malfunctions in any of four flight control actuators. Tail rotor
malfunctions, which are not addressed in this research, are discussed briefly in Appendix B.
4.1 Baseline Adaptive Neural Network Flight Controller
The baseline flight control system employs an adaptive neural network and PCH in a feed-
back linearization scheme to provide precise reference model tracking [37, 39]. The Georgia
Tech Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Laboratory, primarily Dr. Eric Johnson and Suresh Kan-
nan, developed and implemented the baseline controller on the GTMax. Extensive flight
testing has proven the competence of the nominal controller, which is capable of completing
an assigned mission including take off and landing without human interaction. Further-
more, the nominal controller due to its adaptive nature is capable to stabilize the vehicle
in the presence of certain classes of fault conditions. The nominal controller is not capa-
ble of stabilizing the vehicle when one of the flight control actuators has been completely
immobilized or significantly degraded.
The adaptive neural network flight controller conducts dynamic inversion on three con-
trol loops, an outer loop, an inner loop, and a throttle loop. The outer control loop controls
the vehicle’s translational motion (u, v, w) while the inner loop controls angular motion
(p, q, r). Under this scheme, the outer loop generates the collective control and an attitude
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for the vehicle. The attitude generated by the outer loop is fed to the inner loop which
in turn generates the longitudinal and lateral cyclic controls as well as the tail rotor pitch
control. The throttle loop adjusts the engine throttle to achieve the commanded main rotor
angular rate, Ωcom. The neural network allows quick adaptation to the rapidly changing
dynamics in all three loops [40].
To further improve controller performance, each loop also includes pseudo-control hedg-
ing. PCH adjusts the vehicle reference model to allow adaptation despite control saturation.
The inner loop and throttle loop reference models are modified by PCH to account for sat-
uration in each of the vehicle’s control actuators. PCH in the outer loop accounts for
limitations of the inner loop as well as saturations in the collective actuator. Together the
adaptive neural network and PCH make this baseline controller particularly suitable for
active system restructuring [40].
4.2 Restructuring to Accommodate Collective Actuator Faults
In many fault scenarios, reconfiguring the baseline control law is sufficient to recover some
degree of aircraft controllability. Accommodating other faults requires control restructuring
and a completely new control effort. RPM control on a helicopter fits into the latter category.
The control vector for a typical single main rotor helicopter includes four inputs: collective,
δcoll; lateral cyclic, δlat; longitudinal cyclic, δlon; and tail rotor pitch, δtr. Helicopter vertical
thrust is a strong function of both δcoll and Ω, the angular rate of the main rotor. In the
nominal state, vertical thrust is controlled by δcoll with Ω held constant. A throttle control
loop or engine governor manipulates the throttle, δt, to maintain the speed of the main
rotor, Ω, at a constant value, Ωcom. The converse of this control strategy is feasible with
a loss in response time. Variation of Ω requires adding or subtracting rotational energy
from the rotor system. To complicate the issue, most helicopter rotor systems include
a free-wheeling clutch that enables autorotation but hinders RPM control. Aerodynamic
resistance on the rotor blades and hub friction are the only moments available to decelerate
the rotor.
The mechanical linkage in many helicopters including the GTMax and the Renegade
34
UAV are designed without physical actuators that correspond to δcoll, δlat, and δlon. A
mixing unit typically transforms these virtual stick controls to generate the commands for
three swashplate actuators. Details of this transformation are addressed later. Malfunctions
to the virtual collective actuator remain of interest because some rotorcraft such as the
UH-1 do employ collective actuators and because the handling of collective malfunctions






















Figure 8. Adaptive neural network reconfigurable flight controller.
Under reconfigurable flight control, the RPM controller (Figure 8) serves as an outer loop
for the baseline throttle loop. It generates Ωcom, and the baseline throttle loop generates
δt. The case where δcoll is held stationary represents the most severe class of malfunction.
Partially degraded response (reference Equation 1, 0 < Kact < 1) from δcoll provides an
improvement over the fully degraded case. Frequency separation allows the RPM controller
and the baseline outer loop controller to operate simultaneously with δcoll operating at a
higher frequency than Ω. Control restructuring in the event of collective actuator malfunc-
tions does not include any reconfiguration of the baseline controller.
The structure of the RPM controller is identical to the baseline outer loop controllers
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with one exception. The RPM controller assumes third order dynamics, not second order:
ż = w
ẇ = az
ȧz = jz(Ω, Ωcom). (9)




(Ωcom − Ω) (10)
where τ is the time constant of the closed loop, baseline throttle loop. ZΩ is the partial
derivative of the aircraft vertical acceleration with respect to the main rotor RPM. Equa-
tion 10 is easily invertible to generate a control input, Ωcom, from the pseudo-control, ν,
where ν is generated in accordance with [39]. In this case, ν drives the plant to emulate the
following linear system:















)(s2 + 2ωnζs + ω2n) = 0, (13)










Kv = ω2n + 2ωnζ/τ
Ka = 1/τ + 2ωnζ. (14)
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Ωcom is constrained by the main rotor limits of the rotorcraft, and pseudo-control hedging
accounts for this saturation in the controller design. Under certain assumptions, Theorem
1 in [39] guarantees uniform ultimate boundedness of the tracking error and the neural
network weights. Derivation of the control laws required a selection of positive definite
matrices, P ∈ <3×3 and Q ∈ <3×3. Appendix C motivates a particular selection for these
matrices.
Some of the testing conducted in this research employed an alternate, less sophisticated
adaptive neural network controller. That controller, which does not provide the same
stability guarantees as the controller described above, is described in Appendix D.
4.3 Restructuring to Accommodate Swashplate Actuator Faults
Active control of Ωcom alone is not enough to stabilize a vehicle with a degraded swash-
plate actuator. However, by applying active control of Ωcom in conjunction with a simple
transformation to δcoll, δlat, and δlon successful compensation for swashplate actuator faults
becomes feasible. The resulting system exhibits significant coupling between inner loop
cyclic controls and outer loop vertical axis control. Reconfiguring the baseline controller to
operate at lower control bandwidths, ωn, reduces the significance of this coupling.
The swashplate actuators on the GTMax are located at the 3 o’clock, 6 o’clock, and
9 o’clock positions relative to the nose of the aircraft (Figure 9). In the nominal case,
the baseline controller generates the virtual controls, δcoll, δlon, and δlat, and the following
transformation converts them to commands for the swashplate actuators:
δaft = Kcollδcoll + Kaftδlon + baft (15)
δright = Kcollδcoll + Klatδlat + bright (16)
δleft = Kcollδcoll −Klatδlat + bleft. (17)
Generating this transformation for arbitrary placement of the swashplate actuators is
straight forward although additional coupling terms do appear. Research on a high fidelity
model of the AH-64 optimized the placement of the actuators for the purpose of fault-
tolerance [26].
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Figure 9. Right, aft, and left swashplate actuators on the GTMax.
In the event of a swashplate actuator malfunction, the transformation is inverted such
that the failed position of the swashplate actuator becomes an input and δ̂coll is an output.
δ̂coll is the collective setting that makes δlat and δlon feasible. The redundancy provided by
controlling Ωcom enables variation of δ̂coll. For the case of a stuck right swashplate actuator,
the following equation and Equations 15 and 17 form the inversion:
δ̂coll = 1/Kcoll[δ′right −Klatδlat − bright]. (18)
where δ′right is an estimate of the position of the faulty actuator that is provided by the FDI
algorithm.
On the GTMax and the Renegade UAV, RPM control provides the only means for
restructuring; however, more complex systems could integrate other control surfaces such
as a stabilator, δstab. In this case, the reconfigurable flight controllers will overwrite the
baseline controller’s cyclic inputs as well as the collective input with δ̂lon or δ̂lat and δ̂coll,
respectively. This process is implemented in a manner that permits continued adaptation
within the baseline controller.
The following steps describe the process for a malfunction in the aft swashplate actuator
(Figure 10. The enumeration below corresponds with the numbering in the figure).
1. Baseline controller generates the virtual controls, δcoll, δlat, and δlon.
2. Reconfigurable flight controller generates δ̂coll and δ̂lon.
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Figure 10. Swashplate actuator reconfigurable flight controllers.
3. δ̂coll and δ̂lon, are fedback to the baseline controller. The δ̂coll and δ̂lon are interpreted
as saturations on δcoll and δlon respectively, and the baseline controller applies pseudo-
control hedging.
4. Reconfigurable flight controller employs δ̂coll to generate Ωcom for the throttle loop.
In the instance where restructuring includes active control of the stabilator, a second
reconfigurable flight controller generates δ̂stab from the difference δlon − δ̂lon.
5. With δaft immobilized, the derived values of δleft, δright, δt, and perhaps δstab are
applied to the plant.
4.4 GTMax Flight Test Results
Flight tests were conducted on the GTMax to examine the stability and performance of
the reconfigurable flight controllers. First, the performance of the stuck collective controller
was demonstrated. Next, three flight tests demonstrated the performance of the stuck
swashplate actuator reconfigurable flight controllers. During each flight demonstration, the
aircraft executed a constant heading box pattern. This pattern was selected to validate the
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stability of the controllers while hovering forward, backward, and side-to-side. The flight
demonstrations presented in this chapter used a reconfigurable flight controller similar to
the one developed above; Appendix D describes the controller used. The results presented
in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 employed the controller developed in this chapter. As a means
of comparison, the controller employed during flight test operated with ωn = 0.63 and
ζ = 0.75 when combating collective actuator malfunctions. The controller developed above
allowed stable operation in simulation with ωn = 1.25 and ζ = 1.0. Table 2 provides a
comprehensive list of the flight tests conducted under this research. Videos of each flight
test are available online.
4.4.1 Collective actuator malfunctions
To demonstrate the performance of the collective actuator reconfigurable flight controller,
the aircraft was commanded to fly a three-dimensional box pattern with a constant heading
of 0 degrees, aligned with the positive x-axis (north). Depicted in Figures 11 and 12,
the aircraft starts in the lower front corner at a stationary hover. After 15 seconds, the
aircraft initiated the box pattern with a 50-foot climb. Each leg is 10 seconds in duration.
The collective was stuck at its hover trim position, btrim, as determined from flight data
immediately prior to the demonstration (referencing Equation 1, Kact = 0, b = btrim). For
this maneuver, the ωn and ζ in the RPM controller were set to 0.63 and 0.75, respectively.
The largest position error, approximately 3 feet, occurred at the start of the climb, as
expected. The use of acceleration feedback resulted in an excessively noisy command signal,
Ωcom. Future testing should include a filter to protect the throttle actuator from chattering.
Plots of the horizontal position errors are provided for comparison to the stuck swashplate
actuator flight tests.
4.4.2 Swashplate actuator malfunctions
The subsequent three flight demonstrations validated the performance of the aft (Figures 13
and 14), right (Figures 15 and 16) and left (Figures 17 and 18) swashplate actuator recon-
figurable flight controllers, respectively. The aircraft was commanded to execute a level
square pattern with constant heading, 270 degrees, aligned with the negative y-axis. For
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Table 2. Archive of the online fault-tolerant control flight videos available at
http://uav.ae.gatech.edu/videos/ .
# Date Video Clip Actuator Comments
1 7-May-04 f030507c1firstRpmWithGunfire.mpg collective First flight with PID controller
2 7-May-04 f030507c2rpmConStep10Up.mpg collective 10 ft climb, PID controller
3 7-May-04 f030507c3rpmConStepDown.mpg collective 10 ft descent, PID controller
4 7-May-04 f030507c4rpmConClimb70.mpg collective 70 ft climb, PID controller
5 7-May-04 f030507c5rpmConDown70Guns.mpg collective 70 ft descent, PID controller
6 7-May-04 f030507d1rpmFDIduringClimb.mpg collective 70 ft climb, NN FDI, PID controller
7 3-Feb-04 f040203d1_rpmOn.mpg collective first flight of  ANN controller, stationary 
hover8 3-Feb-04 f040203d2_rpm70ftUp.mpg collective 70 ft climb, ANN controller
9 3-Feb-04 f040203d3_rpm70ftDown.mpg collective 70 ft descent, ANN controller
10 3-Feb-04 f040203d4_rpm100ftForward.mpg collective 100 ft forward, ANN controller
11 3-Feb-04 f040203d5_rpm10fpsBox.mpg collective 10 ft/s forward, ANN controller
12 1-Apr-04 f040401h1_fdiStuckCol.mpg collective hover, NN FDI, ANN controller
13 13-Apr-04 f040413c1_stuckColHover.mpg collective hover, ANN controller, windy
14 13-Apr-04 f040413c2_stuckColUp70ft.mpg collective 70ft climb, ANN controller, windy
15 13-Apr-04 f040413c3_stuckColDown70ft.mpg collective 70ft descent, ANN controller, windy
16 13-Apr-04 f040413c4_stuckColSquare.mpg collective 50 ft square, ANN controller, windy
17 13-Apr-04 f040413c5_stuckSbackHover.mpg aft First flight of swashplate actuator malfunction, 
ANN controller
18 13-Apr-04 f040413c6_stuckSbackSquare.mpg aft 50 ft square, ANN controller, limit cycle
19 25-May-04 f040525e1_stuckCol3dbox.mpg collective Climb / descent and square, ANN controller
20 25-May-04 f040525f1_fdiStuckColDown100.mpg collective NN FDI, 100 ft descent, ANN controller
21 25-May-04 f040525f2_fdiStuckColUp100.mpg collective NN FDI, 100 ft climb, ANN controller
22 9-Jun-05 f040609d1_failedBackSquare.mpg aft 50 ft square, ANN controller, no limit cycle
23 9-Jun-05 f040609d2_failedRightSquare.mpg right 50 ft square, ANN controller, no limit cycle
24 9-Jun-05 f040609d3_failedLeftSquare.mpg left 50 ft square, ANN controller, no limit cycle
25 9-Jun-05 f040609zz1_stuckColBobDown.mpg    collective NN FDI, 70 ft descent, ANN controller 
26 9-Jul-04 f040709c3_fdiNoCollective70ftClimb.mpg collective 70 ft climb, NN FDI, false positive, ANN 
controller
27 9-Jul-04 f040709c4_fdiNoSRightBox.mpg right FACT FDI, 50 ft square, ANN controller
28 31-Jul-04 f040731b1_fdiBoxWithFailedRightActuator.m right FACT FDI, 50 ft square, ANN controller
29 19-Aug-04 f040819b2_stuckRightBox.mpg right FACT FDI, 50 ft square, ANN controller
30 19-Aug-04 f040819zz1_stuckCol25fps.mpg collective NN FDI, 70 ft descent, 25 ft/s forward flight, 
ANN controller
31 19-Aug-04 f040819zz1_stuckCol25fps.mpg collective NN FDI, 70 ft descent, 25 ft/s forward flight, 
ANN controller, high collective setting
32 23-Aug-04 f040823d3_vandSRightFailed.mpg right FACT FDI, 50 ft square, ANN controller
33 23-Aug-04 f040823f3_fdiStuckCollective.mpg collective NN FDI, 70 ft descent, 25 ft/s forward flight, 
ANN controller
34 24-Aug-04 f040824b1_fdiStuckCollective.mpg collective NN FDI, 70 ft descent, 25 ft/s forward flight, 
ANN controller
35 25-Aug-04 f040825b13_fdiStuckCollective.mpg collective NN FDI, 70 ft descent, 25 ft/s forward flight, 
ANN controller
36 25-Aug-04 f040825c4_vandFdiFailedRight.mpg right FACT FDI, 50 ft square, ANN controller
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each of the tests, the respective actuator was stuck in its hover trim, btrim, position as
determined by flight data immediately prior to the demonstration (referencing Equation 1,
Kact = 0, b = btrim). The aircraft started in the lower corner in each plot at a stationary
hover. After 15 seconds, the aircraft began the square by moving laterally to the aircraft’s
right, clockwise. Again, each leg is 10 seconds in duration. The RPM controller was set to
operate at ωn = 0.3 and ζ = 1 for all three demonstrations.
The bandwidth of the baseline controller was also reduced for these demonstrations.
Previous flight tests, conducted without reducing the bandwidth of the baseline controller,
resulted in a limit cycle characterized by periodic saturations of δt and Ωcom. For the aft
swashplate actuator test, ωn for pitch control in the inner and outer loops was set to 1.25.
For the left and right swashplate actuator tests, the roll control bandwidths were set to
1.25. The controller normally operates at ωn = 2.0 for the pitch axis and ωn = 2.5 for the
roll axis. This reduction was apparent in the performance of the aircraft in the x− y plane,
but it greatly enhanced vehicle performance on the z-axis. The degradation in performance
occurs on the y-axis for the aft swashplate actuator fault and on the x-axis for the left and
right swashplate actuators.
All four reconfigurable flight controllers performed adequately at a hover. This is no-
table because normal autonomous landings on the GTMax are slow vertical descents from
a stationary hover. Therefore, successful recovery of the vehicle requires stability at a
hover. Presumably the swashplate actuator reconfigurable flight controllers would provide
a smoother response at greater airspeeds where cyclic control is typically less active; how-
ever, they were never activated at ground speeds greater than 10 feet per second. As
expected, the collective actuator controller out-performed all swashplate controllers. The
right swashplate actuator controller presented a noticeably smoother response than the left
swashplate actuator controller. Interaction between the lateral cyclic movements and the
tail rotor thrust are the most likely cause for this discrepancy in performance. The aft
swashplate actuator demonstrated performance similar to the left swashplate actuator, but




























Figure 11. Flight trace with an immobilized collective actuator on the GTMax. Reference
test #19 on Table 2.








































Figure 12. Flight data with an immobilized collective actuator on the GTMax. Reference




























Figure 13. Flight trace with an immobilized aft swashplate actuator on the GTMax.
Reference test #22 on Table 2.







































Figure 14. Flight data with an immobilized aft swashplate actuator on the GTMax.




























Figure 15. Flight trace with an immobilized right swashplate actuator on the GTMax.
Reference test #23 on Table 2.







































Figure 16. Flight data with an immobilized right swashplate actuator on the GTMax.




























Figure 17. Flight trace with an immobilized left swashplate actuator on the GTMax.
Reference test #24 on Table 2.



































Figure 18. Flight data with an immobilized left swashplate actuator on the GTMax.




The active system restructuring component synchronizes the fault-tolerant control architec-
ture’s reaction to a fault. It modifies the inter-connections in the control architecture and
forces reconfiguration in the control laws. Doing so, it conducts the high-level fault isolation
task of Clements’ architecture, and it replaces the redistribution controller and the low-level
gain controller components from the mid-level (Figure 1). A fault declaration requires a
specific response from every component in the architecture. The active system restructuring
component issues restructuring instructions to direct these responses (Figure 5). Employ-
ing prior knowledge about the structure of the system, it reacts quickly to counter a set of
pre-determined faults. Because the low-level controllers are adaptive, a single restructuring
/ reconfiguration compensates for a range of faults. For instance, a single reconfigurable
flight controller accommodates all variations of collective malfunctions (Equation 1). Re-
structuring serves to maximize the existing control effort onboard the vehicle. This process
often necessitates abandoning some of the control objectives of the nominal system.
5.1 Optimization Based Active System Restructuring
In accordance with Equation 8, the objective of the active system restructuring component
is to optimize the performance of the vehicle following the occurrence of a fault:
J(R) = Pe(Fm,R) (19)
where optimization occurs over R, a vector that indicates all restructuring and reconfig-
uration actions applied to the aircraft. The active system restructuring component can
reconfigure the control bandwidths within the baseline and reconfigurable low-level flight
controllers in addition to restructuring the control architecture. A simple yet effective
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expression for Pe has the following form:
Pe =‖ e ‖ +FmT WR. (20)
The expression includes an error function, ‖ e ‖, and a simple cost function. The control
designer should designate an expression for ‖ e ‖ that achieves his control objectives. One
feasible selection is the root mean square position error of the aircraft through the remainder
of its mission. Clearly, such a choice for ‖ e ‖ requires significant computation for even a
modest number of restructuring options. The linear cost term uses the weight matrix W to
penalize certain restructuring actions dependent on the fault condition of the aircraft, Fm.
The cost term allows the control designer to inject prior knowledge about the system into
the performance function.
The following simple example is constructed in the framework of Equation 20. Assume































where it is desired to maintain Ω at its initial value, Ω(0) = 0. RΩ is a restructuring
indicator; if Ωcom 6= 0, RΩ = 1; else RΩ = 0. A simple performance function Pe for this
system takes the form:
Pe = |ẅ − ẅrm|+ |ẇ − ẇrm|+ |w − wrm|+ WΩRΩ. (22)
Note this choice for the error term,
‖ e ‖= |ẅ − ẅrm|+ |ẇ − ẇrm|+ |w − wrm| (23)
only considers the current time step. The cost coefficient WΩ penalizes restructuring to
prevent unnecessary active control of Ω. Despite the simplicity of this performance function,
it enables re-allocation of control effort to accommodate degradation in the response of the
collective control input, i.e. a reduction in b11. ẅ is a linear function of Ωcom so with RΩ = 1
reduction of the error term, |ẅ − ẅrm|, is possible.
Analysis of this performance function, Equation 22, is only possible because the effect of
varying Ωcom is known in advance. This is typical of all Pe functions. In order to optimize
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aircraft performance, the control designer must know the effect that each restructuring ac-
tion will have on the vehicle. For complex systems, the extensive modeling that is required
to capture accurately the effect of every restructuring action becomes prohibitive. Further-
more, substantial computation is required to optimize complex performance functions. In
either case, look-up tables are an efficient alternative. An emergency procedure database
developed off-line using component-based modeling or heuristic judgment can replace an
analytical function for Pe. Incidentally, referring the Equation 19, an emergency procedure
database can be viewed as a performance function with no error term. The flight test results
in this chapter demonstrate use of such a database on the GTMax.
Figure 19 depicts the interaction of the active system restructuring component on the
GTMax with the baseline controller and with the reconfigurable flight controllers developed
in the previous chapter. Although not depicted in the figure, the active system restructuring
component also sends restructuring instructions to the reconfigurable path planner so that
it can re-shape flight paths; to the system identification component so that it can use knowl-
edge of the fault to improve its approximation; and to the mission adaptation component
so that it can modify the sequence of waypoints if necessary. Table 3 conveys the emer-
gency procedure database employed by the active system restructuring component on the
GTMax. The table includes procedures to accommodate tail rotor malfunctions although
a reconfigurable flight controller for this malfunction was not developed (Appendix B).
5.2 GTMax Flight Test Results
The results presented in this section demonstrate the integration of two FDI algorithms,
multiple reconfigurable flight controllers, and the active system restructuring component as
well as all the baseline components. The first two flight tests below employed the state-
dependent neural network FDI routine to detect collective actuator malfunctions. The third
flight test used Vanderbilt’s FACT FDI algorithm to identify a fault in one of three swash-
plate actuators. Each of the flight demonstrations presented below used the reconfigurable
flight controller described in Appendix D. Table 2, located in the previous chapter, provides
a comprehensive list of the flight tests conducted under this research.
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Figure 19. Active system restructuring on the GTMax.
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Table 3. Emergency procedure database employed by the active system restructuring
component on the GTMax.
Fault Restructuring Reconfiguration
Collective Actuator Fault 1. Activate reconfigurable flight controller 
to actively control main rotor RPM.
1. Set reconfigurable flight controller parameters:
ωn=0.63, ζ=0.75*.
2. Activate the reconfigurable path 
planner.
2. Switch to the appropriate fault model in the system 
identification component, and enable adaptation. 
3. Activate the mission adaptation 
component.
Aft Swashplate Actuator 
Fault
1. Activate reconfigurable flight controller 
to actively control main rotor RPM. 
1. Set reconfigurable flight controller parameters:
ωn=0.3, ζ=1.0.
2. Restructure the baseline controller to 
enable external control of the collective.
2. Set baseline flight controller inner and outer loop 
pitch control parameters: ωn=1.25, ζ=1.0.
3. Activate the reconfigurable path 
planner.
3. Switch to the appropriate fault model in the system 
identification component, and enable adaptation. 
4. Activate the mission adaptation 
component.
4. Limit nominal acceleration to 2.5 ft/s/s.
Right/Left Swashplate 
Actuator Fault
1. Activate reconfigurable flight controller 
to actively control main rotor RPM. 
1. Set reconfigurable flight controller parameters:
ωn=0.3, ζ=1.0.
2. Restructure the baseline controller to 
enable external control of the collective.
2. Set baseline flight controller inner and outer loop roll 
control parameters: ωn=1.25, ζ=1.0.
3. Activate the reconfigurable path 
planner.
3. Switch to the appropriate fault model in the system 
identification component, and enable adaptation. 
4. Activate the mission adaptation 
component.
4. Limit nominal acceleration to 2.5 ft/s/s.
Tail Rotor Actuator Fault 1. Activate reconfigurable flight controller 
to actively control main rotor RPM. 
1. Set reconfigurable flight controller parameters, 
appropriately.
2. Activate the reconfigurable path 
planner.
2. Reduce baseline flight controller heave mode control 
parameters.
3. Activate the mission adaptation 
component.
3. Switch to the appropriate fault model in the system 
identification component, and enable adaptation. 
4. Heading mode aligns aircraft with commanded 
velocity vector.  Limit vertical accelerations.
* The simulation results presented in all subsequent chapters used the reconfigurable flight controller developed in the 
previous chapter and ωn=1.25, ζ=1.0.
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Figure 20. Flight data for an immobilized collective actuator with integrated neural
network FDI on the GTMax. Reference test #25 on Table 2.
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5.2.1 Actuator malfunctions with state-dependent fault detection and identi-
fication
The first flight demonstration was initiated with the UAV in its baseline configuration
with no fault applied. The aircraft was commanded to execute a 70-foot descent from
a stationary hover. During the descent, the stuck collective fault was applied binding
the collective in a typical descent position that was determined from flight data on the
day of the flight test. The neural network FDI routine (Figure 6) detected the fault and
issued a fault declaration to the active system restructuring component. The active system
restructuring component elected to activate the appropriate reconfigurable flight controller.
This restructuring compensated for the loss of control authority in the vertical axis, but it
abandoned the control objective to maintain a constant main rotor RPM. While the vertical
response of the aircraft is degraded, adequate performance from the throttle loop allowed
active control of Ωcom to stabilize the vehicle. Switching to a reconfigurable flight controller
implies a change to the inter-connections of the system. Referencing Figure 20, the descent
was initiated at 28 seconds; the fault is applied at 30 seconds; and the fault was detected
prior to 34 seconds. Without reconfiguration, the vehicle would not have been able to arrest
its descent.
At a later date, subsequent flight tests demonstrated that both the FDI routine and the
reconfigurable flight controller can accommodate a collective actuator malfunction while
tracking a considerably more aggressive flight path. Again, the aircraft started with a 70-
foot descent from a stationary hover. The aircraft descended at 10 feet per second, twice
the previous velocity, and accelerated to a forward speed of 25 feet per second. Figure 21
traces the flight path of the vehicle.
Figure 22 presents three time-histories from this flight test. At the bottom of the descent
the aircraft slows from 25 feet per second to 20 feet per second. This is the most demanding
portion of the demonstration for the reconfigurable flight controller; the main rotor RPM
decreases to near 725 (t=42 seconds). During the remainder of the flight test the main rotor
RPM was maintained between 780-920. Reconfigurable path planning, introduced in the



























Figure 21. Flight trace for an immobilized collective actuator with integrated neural
network FDI in forward flight on the GTMax. Reference test #30 on Table 2.
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Figure 22. Flight data for an immobilized collective actuator with integrated neural
network FDI in forward flight on the GTMax. Reference test #30 on Table 2.
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←Fault Flag  
Figure 23. Signal plots for the FDI neural network before and after a collective actuator
malfunction on the GTMax. The dashed line indicates the occurrence of the fault. Reference
test #30 on Table 2.
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trajectories. The aircraft was downwind from 50-70 seconds and upwind from 80-95 seconds.
Tracking is noticeably improved when the aircraft is upwind; the main rotor RPM was also
lower.
The FDI routine reduced its detection time from over 3 seconds on the previous test to
less than 2 seconds. This occurred despite the aggressive flight path because a larger set of
training data was available for the neural network when this test was conducted. Aggressive
flight paths complicate the FDI process for state-dependent FDI algorithms because inten-
tional aggressive maneuvers can manifest themselves like fault modes. Figure 23 depicts the
inputs signals for the collective actuator FDI neural network: vertical position, velocity, and
acceleration error magnitudes, the commanded collective pitch and the main rotor speed.
The hashed box indicates the presence of the fault. The transients in the signals prior to
the onset of the fault were caused by the commanded downward acceleration of the aircraft.
Once the neural network was adequately trained, it efficiently discriminated fault modes
from other disturbances.
5.2.2 Actuator malfunctions with sensor-dependent fault detection and iden-
tification
In another flight test, the FACT FDI routine was employed to detect an immobilized swash-
plate actuator while the aircraft hovered around a 50-foot square (Figure 24). The helicopter
maintained a constant heading, oriented into the wind, through the maneuver. It started
the circuit in the lower corner of the figure and proceeded counter-clockwise. The right
swashplate actuator was immobilized at the hover trim setting during the first leg of the
square (Figure 25). The FDI component issued the correct fault declaration in approxi-
mately one second; the active system restructuring component activated the appropriate
restructuring and reconfiguration. The baseline flight controller operates at reduced control
bandwidths when a swashplate actuator reconfigurable flight controller is active.
The flight test results presented in this chapter validated the use of Table 3 for active
system restructuring on the GTMax. They also exposed the strengths and weaknesses
of the two approaches for FDI. False positives were significant factor in the development




























Figure 24. Flight trace for an immobilized right swashplate actuator with integrated
FACT FDI on the GTMax. Reference test #28 on Table 2.
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Figure 25. Flight data for an immobilized right swashplate actuator with integrated FACT
FDI on the GTMax. Reference test #28 on Table 2.
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the FACT FDI routine. The use of simulated sensors on the actuators also afforded the
FACT FDI routine a faster detection time. The latency associated with fault detection
was not problematic for either FDI routine. This success alludes to another benefit of
using an emergency procedure database. Restructuring instructions are not delayed by the
numerical optimization of a performance function. On the other hand, such an optimization
would provide a better means of accommodating faults that only partially degrade the
actuator response (Reference Equation 1, 0 < Kact < 1.). In this case, the optimization of a
performance function could evaluate whether the severity of a fault necessitates activating
a reconfigurable flight controller. A performance function that utilizes the optimization




UAV flight paths are typically constructed using a conservative reference model. Use of
a conservative model ensures that the resulting flight paths are attainable in adverse en-
vironmental conditions. However, even extremely conservative flight paths can exceed the
capabilities of an aircraft after the onset of a fault. For this reason, reconfigurable path
planning is critical to fault-tolerant control. Figure 26 depicts a flight trace of the GTMax
with an immobilized collective actuator during a flight test conducted last year. This flight
was conducted on the same afternoon as the flight depicted in Figure 21. In fact, the
waypoints and commanded flight path for the two flights were also identical. The baseline
path planner generated the flight path in each flight. The difference in the two flights was
the nature of the fault that occurred. In Figure 21, the collective was immobilized in a
descent setting, a low power setting. In Figure 26, the collective was immobilized at a high
power setting. During the later portion of the trace in Figure 26, the reconfigurable flight
controller tracked the commanded path quite well despite the elevated collective setting.
Of course, at the bottom of the initial descent, where the helicopter was asked to decelerate
vertically and horizontally, the reconfigurable flight controller could not adequately track
the command trajectory. The goal of the fault-tolerant control architecture is to expand
the usable envelope of the fault-impaired unmanned aircraft towards the physical limits of
the degraded airframe. In this test, the collective was immobilized at a particularly difficult
setting, at a particularly difficult time, and the path planner generated a flight path that
exceeded the capability of the impaired system. This example emphasizes the importance
of reconfigurable path planning in recovering mission utility from a degraded UAV. The
remainder of this chapter develops a reconfigurable path planning algorithm to ensure that
the generated flight paths are suitable for the degraded system. The reconfigurable path



























Figure 26. Flight trace with the collective immobilized at a high power setting in forward
flight on the GTMax. Reference test #31 on Table 2.
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generation routine that runs in real-time.
The reconfigurable path planner component includes an instance of the baseline path
planner. It refines the flight paths generated by this copy of the baseline path planner to
create its improved flight paths. The two copies of the baseline path planner are identical
although the mission adaptation component discussed in the next chapter can modify certain
parameters that change the trajectories generated by the second copy of the baseline path
planner. The two copies of the baseline path planner also differ in operation. The second
copy operates at a lower frequency and several seconds in front of the vehicle, on the receding
horizon. The primary baseline path planner operates at the same frequency as the baseline
flight controller with no receding horizon. The baseline path planners on the GTMax and
the Renegade UAV both integrate step functions in jerk to generate flight paths. This
problem can be reduced to a minimum-time constrained linear optimal control problem for
which the solution is a bang-coast-bang type control. Solving the problem off-line generates
switching conditions for the planner. Here are the steps of the baseline process:
1. Determine the direction of the required jerk command based on the switching condi-
tions.
2. Integrate to obtain the acceleration command. The switching conditions ensure that
the acceleration command does not exceed a chosen maximum nominal acceleration.
3. Integrate to obtain the velocity command. The switching conditions ensure that the
velocity command does not exceed a chosen target velocity.
4. Integrate to obtain the position command.
The process is applied in three dimensions. Three parameters, namely the saturation levels
for jerk, acceleration, and velocity, characterize the flight paths generated by this method.
6.1 Linear Programming for Reconfigurable Path Planning
The reconfigurable path planning component takes two inputs to generate an optimized
flight path. It receives a discrete-time linear model of the vehicle dynamics from the system
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identification component,
x(k + 1) = Fx(k) + Gu(k) + d(k)
y(k) = Cx(k). (24)
It also receives waypoints from the third tier of the control hierarchy (Figure 5). Prior to
the optimization process, the commanded flight path is generated from the waypoints using
the algorithm discussed above. This flight path is maintained as a queue of commanded
positions; it is updated and shifted every sample time. Whenever a waypoint is added,
deleted, or changed, the entire path must be recalculated. The reconfigurable path planner
uses the approximate linear model of the vehicle dynamics to reshape the commanded flight
path of the vehicle. The constrained optimization problem is posed as a linear program [23].
Posing the optimization as a linear program has four advantages:
• Using modern software, optimization over a useful window is feasible in real-time.
• Bounds on the actuator positions, actuator rates, state variables, and output errors
are easily applied.
• Optimization can be formatted to minimize the 1-norm, the∞-norm or a combination
of the two.
• The discrete linear model of the system can be changed at any time step in the
optimization window.
Generally, one cannot assume that a UAV will maintain linear dynamics across an
optimization window that lasts several seconds. The inaccuracy that results from this
assumption is mitigated by two features of the chosen design. First, only the first step of
the reconfigurable flight path is sent to the controller. Presumably, the linear model is most
accurate for the first time step. State-dependent Riccati equation control employs a similar
assumption [9]. Second, if predictable changes to the linear model are expected during the
optimization window, approximations for those changes can be applied during the formation
of the linear program. Of course, linear programming excludes the state-dependence of the
linear model from the optimization process.
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To approximate the system response over a window of N sampling periods, the vector
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To complete the system ū , ȳ, and C̄ are also formed accordingly,
x̄(k + 1) = F̄ x(k) + Ḡū(k) + d̄(k)
ȳ(k) = C̄x̄(k). (25)
A suitable goal for the optimization process is to minimize the following objective function:
J(ū) = fT |ȳ − ȳcom| (26)
subject to state and control saturations. ȳcom is the flight path that is generated from the
waypoints expressed in the body frame. f is simply a weighting vector for the error vector,
|y − ycom|. An error bound vector ∆ is introduced to resolve the absolute value,
−∆ ≤ ȳ − ȳcom ≤ ∆. (27)
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To cast the problem in the standard form for a linear program,
min c̃T x̃ (28)
subject to Ãx̃ ≤ b̃
l̃ ≤ x̃ ≤ ũ
where the ˜ notation is introduced so that elements from the linear program are not confused















−C̄(F̄ x(k) + d̄) + ȳc







where I is the identity matrix. The vectors l̃ and ũ are formed to include the bounds on the
error, ∆ and/or ū although applying overly restrictive bounds to the error ∆ can result in
an infeasible system. The bounds on ū may be pulled from Equation 1 or set conservatively
between δmin and δmax. In a final step, the optimal path, ȳ may be determined from ū. This
is easily achieved using Equation 25. The first element of the optimal path, y(k + 1) is sent
to the baseline flight controller and the reconfigurable flight controllers as necessary. The
controls, ū, that are generated during the optimization process are not used for low-level
control. In most instances, the entire path ȳ is not required. In this case, y(k + 1) can be
found directly from Equation 24 pulling u(k) from ū.
Referring to back to Equation 24, the dimension of x is n × 1; the dimension of u is
m × 1; and the dimension of y is o × 1. Allocating two constraints per actuator and no
bounds on the error, ȳ − ȳcom, the linear program in Equation 28 has N(m + o) variables
and 2No constraints.
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The linear program in Equation 28 minimizes the 1−norm of the error, ȳ − ȳcom. The
problem can easily be posed to minimize the ∞−norm. Doing so reduces ∆ to a scalar
significantly reducing the number of unknowns in the linear program. The number of
variables is reduced, but the number of constraints remains unchanged. Nonetheless, a
reduction in computation time may result. A disadvantage of the ∞−norm is that the
optimized path often includes oscillations with the magnitude of the error bounded by the
∞−norm. An alternative to the ∞−norm and the 1−norm is to divide the problem into
multiple sections and optimize each section using the ∞−norm. As the number of sections
approaches N , the 1−norm is achieved.
6.2 Implementation with System Identification Based Adap-
tation
The system identification component takes in the vehicle’s state and its fault condition, and
it constructs a discrete linear model of the vehicle dynamics. The low-level controllers do
not utilize this model. This reduces interaction between the system identification process
and the vehicle dynamics which can arise in indirect adaptive control schemes. The process
estimates a continuous-time model of the system at a relatively high frequency, 25 Hz on
the GTMax, and converts the continuous-time model to a discrete model when necessary
for the optimization process, at 2.5 Hz on the GTMax. Using an extended sampling period
in the optimization process allows extra time for computation without degrading precision.
The control bandwidths of the closed loop system are significantly slower than 2.5 Hz = 5π
radians per second.
The results presented in this chapter employed a simple adaptation to improve the
accuracy of the vehicle model across a variety of flight profiles. Matrices F and G (Equa-
tion 24) were pre-determined based on the content of the fault declaration issued by the
FDI component. The following adaptation was applied to the vector d to account for model
inaccuracies:
d(k + 1) = d(k) + KTe(k) (29)
where K is the adaptation gain. An expression for the error function, e(k), is provided in
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the next section. While a number of more complex methods for system identification are
available, this simple implementation was effective and enhanced the performance of the
reconfigurable path planner across a wide range of airspeeds. Moreover, excluding F and
G from adaptation reduced computation time. The matrices F̄ , Ḡ, as well as the products,
C̄F̄ and C̄Ḡ, were constant and therefore computed offline. d̄, C̄d̄, and ȳcom were computed
online.
6.3 GTMax Simulation Results
The fault-tolerant control architecture including the reconfigurable path planner was ap-
plied to a non-linear simulation of the GTMax [23]. The simulation was distributed on two
personal computers. Splitting the computation is routine as the actual aircraft includes two
onboard computers. The first computer ran the baseline flight controller, the baseline path
planner, active system restructuring, and the mission assignment components as well as
the simulation environment. Algorithms on this computer operated at 50 Hz. The second
computer ran the system identification, reconfigurable path planning, and reconfigurable
flight controller components. The reconfigurable flight controller and the system identifica-
tion component ran at 25 Hz while the reconfigurable path planner ran at 2.5 Hz, T = 0.4
seconds. The linear program was assembled to minimize the 1−norm over a 12-second win-
dow, N = 30. Optimization was conducted on the second computer using ILOG CPLEX
9.0. The linear program consisted of 150 variables and 120 constraints; CPLEX used the
simplex method to solve the program. If the optimization process failed to terminate within
T = 0.4 seconds, the path planner integrated the previous solution forward and continued
to work the solution. However, this rarely occurred.
The following continuous-time model of the helicopter’s longitudinal dynamics was dis-
cretized for use in the optimization process:
ẋ = Ax + Bu
y = Cx (30)
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C was chosen so that y = [x, z]T . fT was chosen as [1 10 .. 1 10]. The longitudinal error
∆x was bounded at 100 feet. This selection for the bound never resulted in an infeasible
linear program. If an infeasible program had occurred, the reconfigurable path planner
would have reformed the linear program without bounding the error. Mission adaptation
discussed in the next chapter offers an alternative to removing the error bounds. During the
optimization, control inputs were allowed half their full range of motion. Ωcom was bounded
between 725 and 925 revolutions per minute; the nominal rotor speed is 850 revolutions per
minute.
To demonstrate the utility of reconfigurable path planning in conjunction with adaptive
neural network reconfigurable flight control, the helicopter was commanded to execute a
sequence of maneuvers that was known to result in an unacceptable baseline flight path.
The collective actuator was immobilized near hover trim for all simulations, and the aircraft
was under active RPM control throughout. The sequence of maneuvers was executed three
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Figure 27. Simulation data with the collective actuator immobilized using a PID recon-
figurable flight controller and the baseline path planner on the GTMax.
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Figure 28. Simulation data with the collective actuator immobilized using an adaptive
neural network reconfigurable flight controller and the baseline path planner on the GTMax.
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Figure 29. Simulation data with the collective actuator immobilized using an adaptive
neural network reconfigurable flight controller and the reconfigurable path planner on the
GTMax.
72
times: once using the baseline path planner with a PID RPM controller (Figure 27), once
using the baseline path planner with an adaptive neural network RPM controller (Figure 28),
and once using the reconfigurable path planner with an adaptive neural network RPM
controller (Figure 29). The helicopter starts the sequence moving forward at 10 feet per
second. Subsequent waypoints direct the helicopter to move forward at [50, 0, 50, 0] feet
per second. The assigned altitude is 30 feet throughout the sequence. As mentioned earlier,
the baseline path planner applies a saturation function to accelerations in its flight paths.
The 5 feet per second per second saturation is clearly visible in Figures 27 and 28. The
adaptive neural network flight controller provides a significant improvement over the PID
controller, but it still cannot maintain the helicopter’s altitude when the helicopter pitches
up to decelerate. In both cases using the baseline path planner, the altitude error nears 15
feet. By smoothing the velocity trajectory, the reconfigurable path planner held the altitude
error during both decelerations to less than 3 feet (Figure 29). Notice that Ω is held at its
lower bound for a large portion of both deceleration arcs. The reconfigurable path planner
decided to arrive late at both stopping points in order to maintain altitude.
The results in this chapter validate the use of reconfigurable path planning as a means
to augment fault-tolerant control. The simulation results clearly indicate that improved
aircraft path planning and aircraft performance can be achieved using linear programming.
Reconfigurable path planning allows the vehicle to assess its condition and generate flight
paths that closely match the capability of the aircraft. Extending reconfigurable path





Given a sequence of waypoints, the reconfigurable path planning component optimizes the
flight path of the aircraft. However, reconfigurable path planning cannot generate an ac-
ceptable flight trajectory unless the sequence of waypoints assigned by the third tier of the
control hierarchy is within the capability of the aircraft. The mission adaptation component
evaluates the capability of the vehicle and constrains the assigned waypoints depending on
the severity of the fault mode. This chapter develops two methods to evaluate the aircraft
capability. One is based on the optimization process conducted by the reconfigurable path
planner; a second relies directly on system identification. Both methods quantify the capa-
bility of the closed loop system in parameters such as maximum acceleration or maximum
velocity that are easily exportable to higher level planning algorithms. In general, higher
level planning algorithms require a simple closed loop model of every vehicle involved in the
mission planning sequence. The use of simple models reduces the complexity of the mission
planning problem to an acceptable level so that techniques such as stochastic differential
games are useful [62]. The DARPA HURT program, which recently completed Phase I flight
demonstrations, employs simplified vehicle models to coordinate the operation of multiple
UAVs conducting a collective surveillance task.
Chapter 2 presented the objective of the entire fault-tolerant control architecture using
the following equation:
J(M,R) = U(Pe,M,Mcom).
The subsequent chapters developed reconfigurable flight controllers, active system restruc-
turing, and reconfigurable path planning for optimizing the performance of the aircraft, Pe,
through restructuring and reconfiguration, R. Each of these functionalities differs distinctly
from mission adaptation, which occurs at the third tier of the fault-tolerant control architec-
ture (Figure 5). The first and second tier functions affect the usefulness of the UAV, U , in
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accomplishing its assigned mission, Mcom, by improving vehicle performance, Pe. Mission
adaptation allows the control architecture to pursue relaxed mission objectives M in order
to achieve greater vehicle usefulness. Both the M and Mcom are expressed as a sequence
of waypoints. Mission adaptation alters parameters of the individual waypoints, such as
the nominal jerks, accelerations and velocities used by the path planners to generate flight
paths. Alternate implementations of mission adaptation could move the actual location of
waypoints or prune waypoints from the sequence. At a minimum, mission adaptation im-
plies a change in the aircraft’s time of arrival at one or more waypoints. By adapting select
waypoint parameters, the mission adaptation component enables the aircraft to accomplish
an altered mission with increased usefulness.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the reconfigurable path planner contains a copy of
the baseline path planner. This copy generates a flight path that becomes the optimization
goal of the reconfigurable path planner. Therefore, if the baseline flight path grossly exceeds
the capability of the degraded aircraft, the reconfigurable path planner cannot compensate.
In the case where the linear program includes bounds on the error vector ∆, an overly
aggressive baseline flight path can result in an infeasible linear program. For instance,
if the baseline path planner commands the aircraft to exceed its maximum velocity, the
position error will increase in time, and the linear program cannot remain feasible. This
situation is alleviated by adapting the baseline path. Successful implementation of mission
adaptation serves to protect the reconfigurable path planning component from infeasible
flight paths.
When constructing flight paths, the baseline path planner integrates a set of parame-
ters that are assigned for each waypoint. These parameters such as the nominal jerk,
acceleration, and target velocity are assigned conservatively so that they do not exceed the
capability of the baseline flight controller. After the occurrence of a fault, the mission adap-
tation component implements an appropriate adjustment to the parameters. Changes to the
parameters can be implemented within the receding window employed by the reconfigurable
path planner.
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7.1 Optimization Based Mission Adaptation Applied to the
GTMax
For decades, linear programming has been employed to generate minimum time solutions
to discrete-time optimal control problems [84]. Under a typical process, an optimal control
solution is generated for a fixed final time. If a feasible solution is achieved, the process is
repeated with a reduced final time. Conversely, if a feasible solution is not achieved, the
process is repeated with an increased final time. In either case, the process is repeated
until the feasible solution with the minimum final time is located. Optimization based
mission adaptation follows a similar process, but it affects the final time indirectly by
changing waypoint parameters such as the nominal jerk and nominal acceleration used by
the baseline path planner.
The reconfigurable path planner developed in the previous chapter minimizes the fol-
lowing function:
J(ū) = fT |ȳ − ȳcom|. (31)
Optimization based mission adaptation adjusts waypoint parameters to bound J(ū) using
the following algorithm:
• Conduct the reconfigurable path planning optimization.
• If J(ū) > kN , adjust the waypoint parameters.
Again, N is the length of the optimization window and k is a scalar weight. Essentially,
it’s the maximum acceptable mean error value. The process identifies the closed loop
performance parameters that allow the aircraft to perform acceptably. The control designer
has the freedom to replace the condition, J(ū) > kN , as necessary to achieve his objective.
However, the method used to adjust the waypoint parameters must be selected carefully. For
instance, decrementing a waypoint target velocity can have a detrimental affect. Decreasing
the nominal acceleration and/or jerk generally results in more attainable flight paths.
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7.1.1 Simulation results
To demonstrate the mission adaptation component, the GTMax was commanded to execute
the same sequence of waypoints used in the previous chapter. However, for this demonstra-
tion the collective was immobilized at a higher setting than in the previous chapter. As a
result, the restructured aircraft is limited in its ability to accelerate downward. For the first
demonstration, all components of the fault-tolerant control architecture excluding mission
adaptation were active. Despite the use of reconfigurable path planning, the aircraft could
not maintain its altitude during deceleration (Figure 30).
Figure 31 depicts the aircraft response using optimization based mission adaptation.
During the simulation, the mission adaptation component, decrements the nominal accel-
eration and nominal jerk of the baseline path planner if J(ū) > 10N . During the initial
portion of the flight the aircraft reduces the nominal jerk and acceleration settings to match
the capability of the aircraft. By t = 53 seconds, the mission adaptation component settles
on its final values for the nominal jerk and nominal acceleration. Notice that the aircraft
does not attempt to stop at the middle waypoint. Once the mission adaptation component
opts to reduce its nominal acceleration, it is too late for the aircraft to successfully deceler-
ate using the reduced value. If overshooting, a waypoint is not an acceptable consequence,
the mission adaptation component could be revised so that it operates sufficiently far in
front of the aircraft. As expected, mission adaptation delays the aircraft’s arrival at its
third stop.
7.2 System Identification Based Mission Adaptation Ap-
plied to the Renegade UAV
Mission adaptation on the Renegade UAV uses a system identification based approach.
The mission adaptation component processes information from the system identification
component to impose limits on closed loop path planning parameters: nominal acceleration
and nominal jerk. The system identification component estimates maximum feasible values
for these parameters using a standard linear model of the vehicle which can be developed
through system identification. The A and B matrices for the Renegade UAV give the
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Figure 30. Simulation data with the collective actuator immobilized at a high setting with
reconfigurable path planning and without mission adaptation on the GTMax.
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Figure 31. Simulation data with the collective actuator immobilized at a high setting with
reconfigurable path planning and mission adaptation on the GTMax.
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following:
u̇ = Xuu− gθ
ẇ = Zww + Zqq + Zθθ + Zδf δf .
The estimate for u̇max is based on the assumption that in steady-state, q ≈ w ≈ ẇ ≈ 0 and




(δmax − δf ) + u̇. (32)
A parallel estimate for u̇min is achieved using δmin. Applying a low pass filter to these
estimates generates consistent values for u̇max and u̇min. De-activating the adaptation of
u̇max and u̇min during certain aggressive maneuvers enhances the identification process.
The mission adaptation component takes the value of smaller magnitude and rounds it
to the nearest 0.5. The rounded value becomes the nominal acceleration used in path
planning. This method of determining the nominal acceleration ignores limitations on
vertical acceleration, ẇ, but vertical accelerations are generally much shorter in duration.
7.2.1 Simulation results
Boeing’s test facility for the Renegade UAV is located in the California high dessert, Vic-
torville, California. During summer months, the high altitude and temperature creates
adverse operating conditions for the under-powered Renegade UAV. The following simula-
tions place the aircraft at 4000 feet above mean sea level, at 95 degrees Fahrenheit. Under
these conditions, the Renegade UAV can approach collective saturation, and its engine is
easily over-strained. Like most UAVs, the Renegade UAV does not adjust its path planning
mechanism based on the ambient temperature or pressure altitude. The aircraft is com-
manded to accelerate forward to 101 feet/second (60 knots), cover a specified distance, and
then decelerate to a stationary hover. Figure 32 depicts the response of the aircraft without
mission adaptation online. The flight includes large altitude errors, collective inputs which
approach saturation at both ends of the scale, and most significantly a main rotor RPM
over-speed during the deceleration. Figure 33 depicts the performance of the aircraft with
mission adaptation online. The altitude error and collective inputs are both well bounded,
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and the main rotor over-speed is avoided. In this demonstration, mission adaptation enables
the aircraft to adapt to uncertain environmental conditions.
System identification based mission adaptation is simpler to implement and far less
expensive computationally than optimization based mission adaptation. However, its ac-
curacy has a strong dependency on the current state of the vehicle, and it fails to consider
the path in front of the aircraft. Optimization based mission adaptation looks forward in
time over a receding horizon, and it includes only an indirect dependency on the state of
the vehicle. The system identification component, which generates the linear model of the
vehicle used in the optimization process, depends on the state of the aircraft. Both meth-
ods for mission adaptation employ an incremental search which accelerates the estimation
process and prevents the parameters from drifting unnecessarily. Mission adaptation can
be employed with or without reconfigurable path planning. The fault-tolerant control ar-
chitecture employed on the Renegade UAV did not use reconfigurable path planning. When
mission adaptation is implemented with reconfigurable path planning, the computational
burden associated with optimization based mission adaptation is greatly reduced. In this
case, use of optimization based mission adaptation is easily justified.
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Figure 32. Simulation data at 4000 feet above mean sea level and 95 degrees Fahrenheit
without mission adaptation on the Renegade UAV.
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Figure 33. Simulation data at 4000 feet above mean sea level and 95 degrees Fahrenheit
with mission adaptation on the Renegade UAV.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED FURTHER
RESEARCH
8.1 Conclusions
The fault-tolerant control architecture developed in this research extends the state of the
art in fault-tolerant control of UAVs. It addresses two shortcomings that Clements acknowl-
edged in his dissertation: it includes a dynamic set point controller (reconfigurable path
planning), and it augments the baseline control architecture with local controllers designed
specifically to combat fault modes. The architecture advocates the use of prior knowledge
and adaptive flight control to optimize the performance of the aircraft after the occurrence
of a fault. Table 4 compares the performance of various algorithms for fault-tolerant control
developed in this research using a numerical performance assessment. For each entry on
the table, the GTMax was commanded to execute an identical set of waypoints, namely the
same waypoints used in the simulations depicted in Figures 28, 29, 30, 31, and 27. The
error terms depicted in the table compare the vehicle’s actual flight trace to the flight path
generated by the baseline path planner, not the reconfigurable path planner. This selection
for the error terms quantifies the performance of the reconfigurable flight controller and
the reconfigurable path planner simultaneously; it assesses the performance of entire fault-










(x− xrm))2 + (z − zrm)2] (33)
This error formulation corresponds with the ten to one weighting present in the reconfig-
urable path planning optimization process. The table excludes mission adaptation results
because mission adaptation invalidates the performance measure by changing the baseline
flight path.
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Table 4. Performance comparison for the fault-tolerant control architecture.





Baseline flight controller, baseline path planner
0.8967 2.2124
2
PID reconfigurable flight controller, baseline path 
planner (Figure 27) X 3.7557 14.7067
3
Adaptive neural network reconfigurable flight 
controller, baseline path planner (Figure 28) X 2.7863 13.8698
4
Adaptive neural network reconfigurable flight 
controller and reconfigurable path planner (Figure 29) X 1.4321 2.1217
Previous fault-tolerant control architectures typically fall into two categories. The first
category employs a single adaptive flight controller designed to accommodate a variety of
fault modes. These controllers use the same adaptive control law before and after the
occurrence of a fault so FDI is not required. On the other hand, without FDI, this ap-
proach to fault-tolerance ignores the fault-condition of the vehicle when constructing its
control vector, and it cannot restructure the system. The controller used in the first row
of Table 4 falls in this category. It performs well in the absence of the fault, but a fault
such as the stuck collective actuator, which is applied on the remaining rows of the table,
would certainly overcome its capability resulting in loss of control of the aircraft. A second
category of fault-tolerant controllers creates a set of individually non-adaptive controllers
and switches between them based the output of an FDI routine. The methodology bene-
fits from the information acquired during FDI. However, because the individual controllers
are not adaptive, the performance of the controllers suffers from modeling uncertainties
and other disturbances. The second row in Table 4 depicts the performance of a PID
RPM controller (Figure 27). The architecture developed in this research includes multi-
ple individually adaptive controllers so a precise model of the post-fault dynamics is not
required. It applies active system restructuring based on prior knowledge about the struc-
ture of the system. The methodology allows the architecture to include a specific response
to a number of fault modes while still enabling adaptation to accommodate unanticipated
faults.
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Reconfigurable path planning provides a means to generate flight paths based on the
degraded capability of the aircraft. Attempting to recover the capability of the nominal
system after the occurrence of a fault is not a realistic course of action. The reconfigurable
path planning component generates adaptive flight paths based on the capability of the
vehicle in real-time. The reconfigurable path planner implemented in Chapter 6 optimized
the GTMax’s longitudinal dynamics, but extension to lateral dynamics is clearly possible.
Further extensions in reconfigurable path planning could include non-linear methods to
generate flight paths. Row 4 in Table 4 quantifies the benefit of reconfigurable path planning
component after the occurrence of a fault. Notice that the maximum vertical error is lower
in Row 4 than in Row 1, where no fault was applied. This result supports the application
of reconfigurable path planning on the baseline system.
Like previous hierarchical fault-tolerant control architectures, this one is expandable
vertically. However, this architecture separates itself from its predecessors by providing
a well defined interface with higher level algorithms. The mission assignment component
(Figure 5) in the third tier of the hierarchy receives sequences of waypoints from higher tier
algorithms. In exchange, the mission adaptation component conducts an online assessment
and captures the capability of the aircraft in a simple model. That model is available to
higher tiers in the hierarchy as a small set of exportable parameters. The DARPA HURT
program is currently constructing an architecture for controlling multiple heterogeneous
UAVs in an urban environment. In its early stages, the HURT program recognized that
simple aircraft models are an essential ingredient for conducting high level mission planning
tasks. By providing a simple aircraft model, the fault-tolerant control architecture devel-
oped in this research facilitates increasing the level of autonomy in unmanned aircraft.
The following list articulates the major contributions of this research:
• An integrated fault-tolerant architecture that incorporates fault detection and iden-
tification, active system restructuring, reconfigurable flight controllers, reconfigurable
path planning, and mission adaptation to optimize the usefulness of the aircraft.
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• An active system restructuring component that maximizes vehicle performance in the
presence of a fault without degrading the performance of the nominal system.
• A suite of adaptive reconfigurable flight controllers with guaranteed stability proper-
ties that employ active control to augment the controllability of the degraded system.
• A reconfigurable path planning component that generates flight paths within the
capability of the degraded system.
• An online system identification process designed to enhance path planning and aid
higher level decision making processes.
• A mission adaptation component that imposes constraints on the closed loop perfor-
mance expectations of the aircraft.
8.2 Application of the Fault-Tolerant Control Architecture
to UAV Upset Recovery
The fault-tolerant control process is readily applicable to another area of recent UAV re-
search, upset recovery. In a sense, upsets such as wind gusts and wake turbulence are
external faults, and the fault-tolerant control architecture developed in this research pos-
sesses all the essential components to conduct successful upset recovery. The architecture
must include an FDI component capable of detecting and identifying upsets using air data
and other sensor inputs. Part of this identification process includes estimating the wind
velocity and direction. Upsets also differ from faults in that they are usually temporary in
nature so the FDI component needs a capability to identify when an upset has terminated.
In the presence of an upset, a typical response involves abandoning precise position control
in favor of attitude control. The active system restructuring component would implement
this change by assigning reconfigurable flight controllers to assume outer loop control func-
tions in the baseline controller. The reconfigurable path planner could generate flight paths
that minimize power changes while the mission adaptation component revises waypoints to
reflect the degraded capability of the aircraft. The procedures for successful upset recovery
would involve every component in the architecture.
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8.3 Integration with Higher Level Control Algorithms
In the current hierarchical control architecture, human operators interface with the third tier
by providing sequences of waypoints for the vehicle. The second tier generates a flight path
from the upcoming waypoints, and the lowest tier generates actuator inputs for the UAV.
Extending this progression from actuator inputs to sequences of waypoints upward will
increase the autonomy of the unmanned system and move the human interface to a higher
tier in the hierarchy. Following the current progression, the fourth tier would generate a
sequence of waypoints from a human operator input. This level of abstraction will consider
factors such as terrain, weather, the location of enemy positions, fuel consumption, and the
health of the aircraft to generate a viable sequence of waypoints.
8.3.1 Post-fault mission planning
The first chapter of this work discussed the typical procedures which human pilots apply
in event of in-flight emergencies. The fifth step, ‘Decide on a course of action’ was not
addressed in the three-tier hierarchical architecture. A four-tier fault-tolerant control ar-
chitecture should address this step. Evaluation of the problem will consider the capability
of the degraded aircraft, the prognosis of the aircraft given its current fault mode, and the
value of the airframe compared to the value of the mission. The fourth tier component
should strive to maximize the accomplishment of assigned mission tasks without exceeding
an allowable risk threshold. Simple risk analysis could evaluate the three options men-
tioned in Chapter 1: Land as soon as possible, Land as soon as practicable, and Continue
the mission. More complex analysis would enable the aircraft to continue its mission in
some degraded fashion with an acceptable risk.
Multi-ship UAV operations compound the difficulty of post-fault mission planning. The
occurrence of a fault in a single aircraft can demand a new course of action for an entire team
of unmanned vehicles. As research moves towards multi-ship UAV operations, contingency
management will dictate the development of high level mission planners.
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8.3.2 Fault-preventive mission planning for risk mitigation
Fault-preventive mission planning poses to apply risk assessment and mitigation to the UAV
mission planning process. Simple applications of fault-prevention such as avoiding icing
conditions or adverse winds may reside at the fourth tier of the control hierarchy. Other
more complex methods would require a higher-level of autonomy which enables considering
the disposition of enemy forces, collision avoidance, the proximity of humans, and the
availability of suitable emergency landing areas among other factors. Providing UAVs with
the autonomy to select suitable landing areas is an active area of research. Fault-preventive




ALGORITHMS FOR SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Linear regression and Kalman filtering are the two most prevalent methods to attack the
system identification problem. For the following discussion on regression, the subscript
“reg” is employed to avoid ambiguity with previously assigned variables. Equation 4 is
restated as:
yreg(n) = θreg(n)T φreg(n) + v(n) (34)
where φreg(n) is the regressor vector [xT , uT ]T , θTreg(n) is the current estimate of a row of
[Af , Bf ], and v(n) is a residual error due to sensor noise and modeling error. In this case,
yreg(n) is an element of ẋf . When certain values of the Af and Bf matrices are known
à priori with certainty, they can be moved to the left side of the equation thus reducing
the length of θreg(n) and φreg(n) and simplifying the estimation process. The least square







r(k) = yreg(k)− θreg(n)T φreg(k)
(36)
where N is the length of the observation window. The sequential least squares solution to
Equation 34 is:
θ∗ = (HT H)−1HT ȳreg (37)
where H = [φreg(n−N + 1), φreg(n−N + 2), ..., φreg(n)]T and
ȳreg = [yreg(n − N + 1), yreg(n − N + 2), ..., yreg(n)]T . It is well known that this solution
can also be achieved recursively thereby avoiding matrix inversion [45].
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The signals commonly encountered in reconfigurable flight “pose significant problems”
for system identification [79]. Flight control architectures require fast and accurate pa-
rameter identification, and the signals frequently lack information content. To overcome
these shortcomings, various improvements to the least squares algorithm have been pro-
posed. One method employs a singular value decomposition method to bypass problems
that occur when (HT H) is nearly singular [16, 68]. This situation, which is common in re-
configurable flight control, occurs when one or more of the regressors are linearly dependent.
The singular value decomposition of H is used to discard information that is not useful.







[r(k)T r(k) + p(k)T W0p(k) + q(k)T W1q(k)] (38)
p(k) = θreg(k)− θreg(k − 1)
q(k) = θreg(k)− θ̂
where θ̂ is an à priori estimate of θ∗. W0 and W1 are weighting matrices. The aug-
mented cost function includes two additional terms. The first additional term restricts the
movement of the estimate, θreg, in the temporal dimension and the second in the spatial
dimension. Seemingly, MSLS would slow the reaction time and degrade the accuracy of the
parameter identification, but results actually show that MSLS out-performs least squares
even when θ∗ 6= θ̂ [79]. The second additional term performs a task called regularization.
Several sources in the literature employ regularization as a means to incorporate à priori
information in estimates [16, 68, 76, 79]. In the simplest methods, θ̂ is set to the best
estimate of the unimpaired θ∗. Other algorithms incorporate additional à priori informa-
tion that is drawn from the linearization of non-linear kinematics [79] or from a polynomial
neural network that is trained offline [77]. Research provides a comprehensive lineariza-
tion for the flight dynamics of a small unmanned rotorcraft [9, 30]. Linear regression with
intercepts allows the estimation to account for unknown bias terms such an aircraft trim
condition [51]. When the methods described thus far fail to extract sufficient information
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from the system, the designer can intentionally stimulate the control inputs to inject infor-
mation. Stimulating the null space of the control matrix B does not affect the response of
the vehicle [20].
All the identification methods discussed thus far involve minimization of an error func-
tion in the time domain. Fourier transform regression (FTR) conducts identification in
the frequency domain [59, 70]. The algorithm employs the standard least squares solution
to extract estimates from discrete Fourier transforms of the regressor signals. A recursive
formulation for the Fourier transform reduces the computation involved [70]. FTR enables
the control designer to select which frequencies to include in the regression. In fact, the
algorithm is quite sensitive to the designer’s choice of frequencies. For determination of
flight stability and control derivatives, the high frequency components of the regressors are
discarded. Injection of constant frequency disturbances to the control vector can be used to
stimulate the frequency domain estimation process. In this case, the injection frequencies
can be weighted in the estimation process [50, 70]. In support of NASA’s IFCS program,
FTRs had mixed results. During actual flight test, the algorithm was very successful in the
identification of certain derivatives and unsuccessful on others.
Kalman filtering is a popular alternative to linear regression. Multiple sources employ
Kalman filters to estimate portions of the Bf matrix [57, 87]. The process extends the
classical Kalman filter that estimates the aircraft state. Adaptive parameter smoothing
uses the parameter error variance to adaptively tune the filter’s forgetting factor. The
algorithm improves the parameter estimation and precludes bursting [57]. Kalman filters
are easier to implement than regression algorithms, and state estimation Kalman filters
often already exist with the control architecture. A variety of modern algorithms such as
fuzzy logic, neural networks, and particle filters are also well-suited for the state estimation
problem. Gutièrrez employed fuzzy neural networks to update each of the linear models in
his AMTC architecture. A recursive least squares method that he developed was used to
train the fuzzy neural networks [32].
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APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION OF TAIL ROTOR MALFUNCTIONS
This research did not address tail rotor malfunctions although restructuring to accommodate
tail rotor malfunctions is possible. Several manned aircraft include emergency procedures
for stuck left pedal (high power) and stuck right pedal (low power) faults. Incidentally,
these malfunctions occur more commonly than other actuator malfunctions because the
linkage through the tail boom is longer and more prone to damage. Two characteristics
specific to the tail rotor malfunction make reconfigurable flight control challenging. First,
most procedures that involve tail rotor malfunctions terminate to a running/rolling landing
allowing airspeed to oppose the errand yaw condition. Unmanned rotorcraft have not
reached a level of autonomy where they can conduct running landings especially in the
presence of a fault. Second, using RPM control to compensate for a tail rotor malfunction
creates a non-minimum phase system. Increasing the main rotor RPM, (Ω̇ > 0) causes a
right yawing moment on a conventional helicopter whereas the actual increase in tail rotor
RPM (∆Ω > 0) creates a left yawing moment. Despite these challenges a reconfigurable
controller that enables aircraft recovery and continued forward flight in the presence of a
tail rotor fault is certainly possible.
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APPENDIX C
SELECTION OF RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT
CONTROLLER MATRICES P AND Q
Appendix B of [37] describes a method for selecting the matrices P and Q for a second order
adaptive neural network flight controller. This appendix motivates a selection for P ∈ <3×3
and Q ∈ <3×3 for the reconfigurable flight controller described in Chapter 4. When the
dynamics of the system are linearized about the notional equilibrium point where the model
in Equation 10 matches the actual model, and all the neural network weights are zero, the
following system results:
ë = Aė− kBΓW BT Pe (39)
where A is given in Equation 14; BT = [0, 0, 1]; and ΓW = I is a learning rate for the neural
network. k = (14n2 + b) is a scalar constant. n2 is the number of hidden layer neurons in










Therefore, the third row of Equation 39 expands to:
˙̈e˙1 + Kȧë1 + (Kv + kp3)ë1 + (Kp + kp32)ė1 + kp31e1 = 0, (41)
where e1 = z − zrm which has the form,
(s2 + 2ω1ζ1s + ω21)(s
2 + 2ω2ζ2s + ω22) = 0 (42)
or equivalently,









2 = 0. (43)
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Equation 41 leaves the designer three degrees of freedom (p31, p32, p3) to place four para-
meters of the fourth order linear system, (ω1, ω2, ζ1, ζ2). Choosing to set ζ1 = ζ2 = 1 and

















where Ka = 2ω1ζ1 + 2ω2ζ2, implies ω2 = 12τ . Enforcing that Q = −AT P − PA is diagonal























































which is positive definite because ω2 = 12τ > 0. Note these relatively simple expressions for
P and Q only hold if ω1 precisely equals ωn. Nonetheless, assuming that the expression
for Q is constant over variations in ω1 results in a simple optimization problem. Setting
ω1 = 1, maximizes the minimum eigenvalue of Q over a wide range of control parameters
ωn and τ , namely if Ka > 3.5.
Based on this result, the simple expressions for p31, p32, and p3 in Equation 44 and
ω1 = 1 were used in the GTMax RPM controller. Doing so dictates new values for p1,
p12, and p2; a diagonal Q matrix is still achievable. Figure 34 depicts the fluctuation of
the eigenvalues of Q over ω1 using ωn = 1.25 and Ka = 5, the settings on the GTMax.
The actual maximum of λmin(Q) occurs near ω1 = 1. λmin(Q) is nearly doubled by using
ω1 = 1, not ω1 = ωn. Also, note that a poor choice of ω1 can render a Q that is not positive
definite, a case which does not occur with ω1 = ωn.
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Figure 34. Fluctuation of the eigenvalues of Q as a function of ω1 with Ka = 5.
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APPENDIX D
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALTERNATE
RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROLLER
An alternate RPM controller updates an adaptive neural network to minimize model er-
ror, not tracking error. The controller depends on the assumption that a neural network
converges using standard back propagation. Unlike the controller developed on Chapter 4
it does not have guaranteed stability properties. In the event the neural network fails to
converge, a PID controller is activated. Through several flight tests, the control strategy
performed well and the neural network did not diverge.





(Ωcom − Ω). (46)
The control Ωcom to achieve a desired rotor angular rate, Ωdes is thus:
Ωcom = τ Ω̇des + Ωdes. (47)
A feedback linearization type controller is used to control the vertical thrust of the degraded
system. Assuming the plant has affine dynamics:
ẇ = f + gΩ (48)
where w is the translational velocity of the vehicle in the z direction. The following control




[armz − f ′ −Kd(w − wrm)−Kp(z − zrm)]. (49)
where armz , wrm, and zrm indicate the desired vertical dynamics of the vehicle. A second
order filter is normally applied to these dynamics prior to inclusion in the control law above.
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f ′ and g′ are estimates of the actual f and g such that
ẇ′ = f ′ + g′Ω. (50)
f ′ is estimated by a linear combination of the state and control vectors plus the output of
the adaptive neural network . The input layer of the network consists of the vehicle state
and control vectors and the linear estimate. Back propagation updates the single hidden
layer network to minimize the model error, ε. g′ is approximated simply as a constant.
Scheduling g′ with horizontal velocity has also proved to be beneficial in simulation.
ε = ẇ − ẇ′ = ∆f + ∆gΩ (51)




[τẅcom + ẇcom − τ ḟ ′ − f ′ − τKdë1 (52)
−(τKp + Kd)ė1 −Kpe1].
The error dynamics of the system reduce to:




+ Kp)ė1 − Kp
τ
e1 + ε/τ + ε̇. (53)
Assuming convergence of the network, ε and ε̇ are negligible. The characteristic equation




)(s2 + 2ωnζs + ω2n) = 0. (54)
Kp and Kd are set as follows to dictate the performance of the second order system:
Kp = ω2n (55)
Kd = 2ωnζ. (56)
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